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Special Forces' Wear of Non-Standard Uniforms*
W. Hays Parks**
In February 2002, newspapers in the United States and United Kingdom
published complaints by some nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs") about
US and other Coalition special operations forces operating in Afghanistan in
"civilian clothing."' The reports sparked debate within the NGO community
and among military judge advocates about the legality of such actions.2 At the
US Special Operations Command ("USSOCOM") annual Legal Conference,
May 13-17, 2002, the judge advocate debate became intense. While some
attendees raised questions of "illegality" and the right or obligation of special
operations forces to refuse an "illegal order" to wear "civilian clothing," others
urged caution.3 The discussion was unclassified, and many in the room were not
Copyright © 2003 W. Hays Parks.
Law of War Chair, Office of General Counsel, Department of Defense; Special Assistant for
Law of War Matters to The Judge Advocate General of the Army, 1979-2003; Stockton
Chair of International Law, Naval War College, 1984-1985; Colonel, US Marine Corps
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Defense or any other agency of the United States government. The author is indebted to
Professor Jack L. Goldsmith for his advice and assistance during the research and writing of
this article.
I See, for example, Michelle Kelly and Morten Rostrup, Identifi Yourselves: Coalition Soldiers in
Afghanistan Are Endanging Aid Workers, Guardian (London) 19 (Feb 1, 2002).
2 The judge advocate debate is exemplified by Maj. William H. Ferrell, III, USMC, No Shirt,
No Shoes, No Status: Uniorms, Distinction, and Special Operations in International Armed Conflict
(unpublished paper, 50th Judge Advocate Officer Graduate Course, The Judge Advocate
General's School, US Army 2002) (on file with author); Lt. Col. H. Allen Irish, USAR,
Are Soldiers in Civilian Clothes Protected under Geneva-Hague? (unpublished paper, 2002) (on
file with author); and Maj. Robert J. Drone, USAF, Nontraditional Uniforms Do Accord
Prisoner of War Status for Special Operations Forces (unpublished LLM thesis, George
Washington University, 2003) (on file with author).
3 In the debate that ensued over the next year, it was my observation that those most
strident in their criticism were most distant from Special Forces ground operations or
were judge advocates not serving with or familiar with the missions of Special Forces
units.
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privy to information regarding Operation ENDURING FREEDOM,4 Special
Forces,' its special mission units,6 or the missions assigned them.
ENDURING FREEDOM was the US designation for military operations against al
Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan that commenced following the al Qaeda
terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. See,
for example, Robin Moore, The Hunt for Bin Laden: Task Force Dagger (Random House
2003).
5 In official US terms, Spedal Operations Forces are "[t]hose Active and Reserve Component
forces of the Military Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically
organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations."
Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionagy of Military
and Associated Terms 493 (April 12, 2001, as amended through May 7, 2002), available
online at <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict> (visited Oct 6, 2003). Within the
US military, this includes US Army Special Forces, Psychological Warfare units, and Civil
Affairs units; Naval Special Warfare forces; and Air Force Special Operations forces.
Special Operations are defined as:
Operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military
and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or
informational objectives by unconventional means in hostile, denied, or
politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted across the full range
of military operations, independently or in coordination with operations of
conventional, non-special operations forces. Political-military considerations
frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low
visibility techniques and oversight at the national level. Special operations
differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk,
operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly
support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous
assets.
Id at 492-93.
In the US military, special forces (in the more generic sense of the term) include US
Army Special Forces, US Naval Special Warfare units (in particular, SEALs (Sea, Air, Land))
and Air Force Special Tactics units. Specialforces are "US Army forces organized, trained, and
equipped specifically to conduct special operations. Special forces have five primary
missions: unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, direct action, special
reconnaissance, and counter-terrorism. Counter-terrorism is a special mission for specially
organized, trained and equipped special forces designated in theater contingency plans." Id at
491. Naval spedal wa!fare forces are "[t]hose Active and Reserve Component Navy forces
designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained and equipped
to conduct and support special operations," while naval spedal warfare is defined as "[a]
designated naval warfare specialty that conducts operations in the coastal, riverine, and
maritime environments. Naval special warfare emphasizes small, flexible, mobile units
operating under, on, and from the sea. These operations are characterized by stealth, speed,
and precise, violent application of force." Id at 361. Naval Special Warfare includes SEALs,
Swimmer Delivery Vehicle Teams, and Special Boat Teams. A special tactics team is a:
US Air Force special operations task-organized element that may include
combat control, pararescue, and combat weather personnel who are organized,
trained, and equipped to establish and control the air-ground interface at an
airhead in the objective area. Functions include assault zone reconnaissance
and surveillance, establishment, and terminal control; combat search and
rescue; combat casualty care and evacuation staging; and tactical weather
observations and forecasting.
Id at 495.
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The topic provides lessons and questions for consideration of future issues
by judge advocates. The questions are:
For the history of US Army Special Forces, see Col. Aaron Bank (Ret.), From OSS
to Green Berets: The Birth of Special Forces (Presidio 1986) (on file with author), and Alfred H.
Paddock, Jr., U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins (Kansas rev ed 2002) (on file with
author). For the SEALs and their Underwater Demolition Team predecessors, see Cdr.
Francis Douglas Fane, USNR (Ret.) and Don Moore, The Naked Warriors: The Story of the
U.S. Nag' Frogmen (Appleton-Century-Crofts 1956) (reprinted by Naval Institute Press
1995); Orr Kelly, Brave Men, Dark Waters: The Untold Story of the Nagy SEALe (Presidio
1992); T.L. Bosiljevac, SEALs: UDT/SEAL Operations in Vietnam (Paladin 1990); and
James Douglas O'Dell, The Water Is Never Cold (Brassey's 2000). For Air Force Special
Tactics Units, see Col. John T. Carney, Jr. and Benjamin F. Schemmer, No RoomforError:
The Covert Operations of America's Special Tactics Units from Iran to Afghanistan (Ballantine
2002). Coalition special forces that served in Afghanistan have a lineage and missions
similar to those of US special forces. See, for example, Philip Warner, The Special Air
Service (William Kimber 1971); John Strawson, A History of the S.A.S. Regiment (Seeker&
Warburg 1984); Tony Geraghty, Who Dares Wins: The Story of the SAS, 1950-1992 (little,
Brown, 3d rev ed 1992); David Homer, SAS: Phantoms of the Jungle: A History of the
Australian SpecialAir Service (Allen & Unwin 1989); W.D. Baker, 'Dare to Win": The Story of
the New Zealand SpecialAir Service (Spa 1987), and other references contained in the State
Practice sections of this article (Section IV.B. and Appendix). In this article, spedalforces
("SF") includes US Army Special Forces, Naval Special Warfare SEALs, Air Force Special
Tactics Units, and coalition special forces, while spedal operationsfores ("SOF" or "Special
Operations") includes Special Forces, UA Army Psychological Operations units, and Civil
Affairs units.
While the Marine Corps until recently (and at the time of the NGO complaint)
was not a part of the special operations community, Marine Corps personnel from 2nd
Intelligence Ba.talion, II Marine Expeditionary Force, assigned to 4th Marine
Expeditionary Brigade were operating in Afghanistan in non-standard uniform
(indigenous attire with pakol and Northern Alliance scarf), as described on pp 5-9, in late
winter 2001 and spring 2002. Discussion with Lt. Col. Joseph H. Wheeler III, USMC,
Warfighting Faculty, Marine Corps Command & Staff College (September 5, 2003) and e-
mail from Lt. Col. Wheeler to author (September 8, 2003), who provided photographs
for this author's files. The Marine Corps move to develop a limited special operations
capability is described in Lt. Col. Giles Kyser, Fix Recon, USSOCOM, and the Future of the
Co ps: Foodfor Thought, 87 Marine Corps Gazette 16-21 (July 2003).
6 Special mission unit is "[a] generic term to represent a group of operations and support
personnel from designated organizations that is task-organized to perform highly
classified activities." Joint Publication 1-02 at 492 (cited in note 5). It should be noted
that increased (higher) classification is not a method for engaging in activities beyond the
law. As noted in the definition of Special Operations in the preceding paragraph, special
operations involve "political-military considerations [that] frequently shape special
operations, requiting clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques and oversight at the
national level." Id (emphasis added). It has been the author's personal experience in
providing legal support for special missions units for a quarter of a century that special
mission unit operations receive more policy and legal oversight-up to the national
level-than virtually any other military unit or operation. Because of their sensitive nature
and potential risk to individuals operating in denied areas, access to information relating
to special mission unit operations necessarily is limited. The judge advocates most
strident in their criticism of Special Forces wearing non-standard uniforms were not privy
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I. What are the facts?
II. What are the legal issues?
A. Is it lawful for combatants to wear civilian clothing or non-
standard uniforms in combat?
B. If so, are there legal or other considerations in use of either?
C. Are there any unique law of war considerations, such as risks, a
commander should balance in making his decision?
III. What is the nature of the armed conflict and its armed participants?
A. Was there something unique about Operation ENDURING
FREEDOM with respect to application of the law of war?
B. If so, how would application of the law of war differ?
IV. What is the relevant law of war?
A. What is the applicable treaty law and legislative history?
B. What is state practice, including court decisions?
I. WHAT ARE THE FACTS?
Thirty years ago it was my privilege to serve as the first Marine Corps
Representative at The Judge Advocate General's ("JAG") School, US Army, in
Charlottesville. As the lone Marine on the faculty, I was expected to attend all
major public ceremonies, including the graduation of each Judge Advocate
Officers Basic Course-the accession course for new lawyers entering the Army.
Course graduation warranted a speech by one of the Army JAG Corps' flag
officers. Regardless of who the graduation speaker was, the speech was the
same. Written by The Assistant Judge Advocate General of the Army, the late
Major General Lawrence H. Williams, it was called "the facts speech." Its
message was simple and straightforward: before charging off to tilt at windmills,
be sure you have the facts.
There is much to be said for this admonition and its application in the case
at hand. Condemning certain actions or declaring them a law of war violation
based upon news accounts is not a sound basis for analysis. No lawyer would
prepare his case based solely upon news accounts. Indeed, media reports
generally are inadmissible as evidence. Regrettably, some rushed to judgment
based on less-than-reliable sources.
There are two fundamental issues. The first is what was being worn, and by
whom. The second is the motive for the NGO complaints.
In response to the September 11, 2001 al Qaeda terrorist attacks against
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, US and Coalition Special Forces
began operations in Afghanistan in late September 2001. At the request-
initially insistence-of the leaders of the indigenous forces they supported, they
dressed in indigenous attire. For identification purposes within the Northern
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Alliance, this included the Massoud pakol (a round brownish-tan or gray wool
cap) and Massoud checkered scarf, each named for former Northern Alliance
leader Ahmad Shah Massoud, who was assassinated days before the al Qaeda
attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. This attire was not worn to
appear as civilians, or to blend in with the civilian population, but rather to lower
the visibility of US forces vis-A-vis the forces they supported. Al Qaeda and the
Taliban had announced a $25,000 per head bounty on uniformed US military
personnel. Placing a US soldier in Battle Dress Uniform ("BDU") or Desert
Camouflaged Uniform ("DCU") in the midst of a Northern Alliance formation
would greatly facilitate al Qaeda/Taliban targeting of US Special Forces As will
Special Forces' wear of Northern Alliance attire was undertaken at the insistence of
Northern Alliance General Abdul Rashid Dostum, commander of its 8,000-man Junbish-
e-Millie, the largest Northern Alliance army. President William J. Clinton ordered the
prompt withdrawal of US forces from Somalia following the October 3, 1993 Battle of
Mogadishu in which eighteen members of Task Force Ranger died; see Mark Bowden,
Blackhawk Down: A Stogy of Modem War (Atlantic Monthly 1999). General Dostum feared
US withdrawal from Afghanistan if confronted with US casualties. Multiple Northern
Alliance bodyguards were assigned to each US Special Forces soldier. In the early days of
fighting, General Dostum told some of his subordinates in Mazar-e-Sharif that he would
kill them if they allowed their US charges to be hurt or killed. Once US and coalition
forces showed that they were not casualty averse, the bodyguard standards were relaxed.
SF wear of the Northern Alliance pakol, tribal scarves, and beards prevented them from
being singled out for targeting by al Qaeda/Taliban personnel. Wearing indigenous attire
also aided SF rapport with the Northern Alliance forces they supported. Special mission
unit Special Forces, whose identities are classified, also wore beards to reduce risk of
media/public identification.
The risk is not new. In 1915, serving in the Arabian Peninsula as a military adviser
to Wahabi chief Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, British Army Captain William H.I. Shakespear
eschewed indigenous attire. During a battle between the forces of Ibn Saud and pro-
Turkish tribal leader Ibn Rashid, Shakespear was killed by an enemy sniper when his
British Army uniform singled him out and identified him as a high-value target. Jeremy
Wilson, Lawrence of Arabia: The Authorized Biography of TE. Lawrence 1043 n 4 (Athenaeum
1990); Robert D. Kaplan, The Arabists: The Romance of an American Elite 55-56 (Free Press
1993). The author thanks Max Boot for bringing this to his attention. Knowledge of the
circumstances of Captain Shakespear's death prompted T.E. Lawrence to wear Arab
clothing as he lead the Arab revolt against Ottoman rule that began June 5, 1916, and to
incorporate the lesson into Articles 18-20 of his Twenoy-Seven Aricles published in August
1917 as lessons learned. Wilson at 960, 1043 n 4. Articles 18-20 are discussed below in
note 73.
Indigenous personnel over-protection of US Special Forces personnel is not new.
Office of Strategic Services ("OSS") Operational Team MUSKRAT/BEAR experienced
the same phenomenon in China in 1945. Frank Mills, Robert Mills, and John W. Brunner,
OSS Special Operations in China 300, 321 (Phillips 2002) (on file with author).
In Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, Special Forces wear of the pakol was
possible because of the Pashtun (Taliban) versus Tajik/Uzbek (Northern Alliance)
differences in attire. Special Forces supporting Southern Alliance forces were confronted
with a more difficult situation. Southern Alliance soldiers looked and dressed exactly like
the Taliban. Afghan Taliban dressed in Pashtun attire since they were from the Pashtun
tribes. Other Taliban, from Pakistan predominantly, wore Pakistani attire.
Fall 2003
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be seen in my review of the law, dressing in this manner more accurately may be
described as wearing a "non-standard uniform" than "dressing as civilians."
Special Forces personnel who had served in Afghanistan with whom I spoke
stated that al Qaeda and the Taliban had no difficulty in distinguishing Northern
Alliance or Southern Alliance forces from the civilian population.8
The fall of Kandahar in early December 2001 was followed by the collapse
of the Taliban regime and the swearing-in of Hamid Karzai as Prime Minister.
Another group of US Special Operations Forces-Army Civil Affairs 9 -began
to enter Afghanistan. In November 2001, the US Army Central Command
("ARCENT")' ° had established the Coalition and Joint Civil Military Operations
Task Force ("CJCMOTF") using soldiers from the 377th Theater Support
Command ("TSC"), the 122nd Rear Operations Center, and the 352nd Civil
Affairs Command. By January 3, 2002, the CJCMOTF was established in Kabul.
It served as liaison with local officials of the Interim government and supervised
the humanitarian assistance from US Army Civil Affairs ("CA") teams from the
96th Civil Affairs Battalions, who were beginning to operate throughout
Afghanistan. CJCMOTF also was the liaison with the US Embassy, and
coordinated coalition humanitarian assistance contributions.
The ARCENT Commanding General made the uniform decision, favoring
civilian clothing over DCU. His rationale was based on two factors: (a) the
In the south, Special Forces wear of indigenous attire and its distinguishing devices
was encouraged by Hamid Karzai to lower US visibility. Accordingly, these Special
Forces wore native tops over their DCU. After three days, the Special Forces abandoned
the indigenous tops for the balance of their tenure, their leader having convinced Karzai
that as everyone knew they were American, there was no reason to pretend otherwise. It
also gave the soldiers better access to their DCU pockets and load-bearing equipment.
Because neither Taliban/al Qaeda nor Northern or Southern Alliance forces wore a
uniform, visual friend or foe identification at a distance was a challenge. Third Battalion,
Fifth Special Forces Group, The Liberaion of MaZar-e Sharif 5th SF Group UW in
Afghanistan, 15 Special Warfare 34, 36 (June 2002). However, this differs from dressing as
civilians for the purpose of using the civilian population or civilian status as a means of
avoiding detection of combatant status. From the standpoint of possible violation of the
law of war, the issue is one of intent. As indicated in the main text, use of non-standard
uniform (Massoud pakol and/or scarf) by some Special Forces personnel was to appear as
members of the Northern Alliance rather than be conspicuous as US soldiers and, as
indicated in the preceding footnote, high-value targets.
9 Civil affairs refers to "[d]esignated Active and Reserve component forces and units
organized, trained and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to
support civil-military operations," while Civil affairs actities are defined as "[a]ctivities
performed or supported by civil affairs that (1) enhance the relationship between military
forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present; and (2) involve
application of civil affairs functional specialty skills, in areas normally the responsibility of
civil government, to enhance conduct of civil-military operations." Joint Publication 1-02
at 86 (cited in note 5).
10 US Army Central Command is Third US Army, Fort McPherson, Georgia, when not
forward deployed.
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ability of soldiers to perform humanitarian assistance operations; and (b) the
safety of Civil Affairs personnel-that is, force protection.1 A strong desire
In Are Soldiers in Civilian Clothes Protected under Geneva-Hague? at 31 (cited in note 2),
Lieutenant Colonel H. Allen Irish provided the following official rationale for the
decision:
The need to reduce the potential for violence that may be directed at
CJCMOTF personnel engaged in humanitarian relief efforts in Afghanistan
was the critical factor mandating the decision [to operate in civilian clothing].
In uniform, [CJCMOTF] personnel may be targeted since they could be
confused as being engaged in offensive combat operations instead of
providing humanitarian assistance .... The traditional wear of civilian clothes
by unconventional forces for the purpose of humanitarian assistance is time-
proven.
This rationale is historically inaccurate and legally flawed. Civil Affairs personnel
performing humanitarian assistance in operations short of international armed conflict
have been authorized to wear civilian clothing. Civil Affairs personnel have worn
standard uniforms only in international armed conflict. US Army and Marine Corps Civic
Action (Civil Affairs) personnel operating in the Republic of Vietnam (1964-1971) wore
standard field uniforms in threat circumstances similar to those faced by Civil Affairs
personnel in Afghanistan. US Army Civil Affairs operating in support of Operation JUST
CAUSE (Panama, 1989-1990) and Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT
STORM/PROVIDE COMFORT (1991) wore standard BDU. These operations were
significantly different from Special Forces missions in denied territory.
From a law of war standpoint, neither "force protection" nor a desire to
distinguish soldiers performing "offensive duties" from those engaged in humanitarian
assistance constitutes military necessity for soldiers to wear civilian attire in international
armed conflict. From the enemy standpoint (particularly the Taliban and al Qaeda),
humanitarian assistance to Afghan civilians may constitute as much a threat as a soldier
engaged in offensive operations.
With respect to the force protection argument, US Army Civil Affairs doctrine in
preparation at the time of the "force protection" decision (and subsequently approved) is
to the contrary. US Army Field Manual 3-05.401, Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques and
Procedures, Table 4-2, p 4-40 (on file with author), indicates that Civil Affairs personnel in
less than full Battle Dress Uniform, complete with combat equipment, to include Kevlar
load bearing vest and individual weapon, risk reduced force protection, while noting that
wearing civilian clothing "[g]reatly increases the possibility of fratricide."
Notwithstanding the eloquence of Lieutenant Colonel Irish's arguments and the
outstanding work Civil Affairs units have performed in Afghanistan and Iraq (the latter in
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the 2003 coalition effort to remove dictator Saddam
Hussein), there is no law of war basis for Civil Affairs personnel to wear anything other
than standard uniform in an international armed conflict.
The Bush Administration decision to regard Operation ENDURING FREEDOM
as an international armed conflict was not made until early February 2002. It is an
example of how good-faith differences may occur between how an on-scene commander
views a conflict and the way it may be regarded in Washington. In this case, the
Combatant Commander and his subordinate commanders saw the mission as one short
of international armed conflict. This difference is commonplace, though the positions of
the participants (Washington and the field commander) usually are in reverse. For
example, on December 4, 1983, a US Navy air strike was launched against terrorist-
related targets in the Beka'a Valley in Lebanon. Poorly executed, two aircraft were lost,
and the Syrians captured one serviceman. In a press conference on December 20th,
President Ronald Reagan was asked if the man was a prisoner of war. He replied:
Fall 2003
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existed at US Central Command ("USCENTCOM") headquarters (Tampa) to
present a non-confrontational face, as well as a belief that NGOs were reluctant
to be seen working with uniformed soldiers. Additionally, 96th Civil Affairs
Battalion personnel, who initially operated in Islamabad, Pakistan, were ordered
by the United States Ambassador to Pakistan to wear civilian clothing rather
than their uniforms, reflecting the sensitive, unique political environment in
which US Army forces were operating. This order was not clarified or
countermanded on entry into Afghanistan. Civil Affairs personnel continued to
wear Western civilian attire. Eventually some adopted Afghan native attire.
12
Other reasons existed for continued wear of civilian attire. In some areas
local governors would not talk to uniformed Civil Affairs personnel. In
December 2001, the UN-sanctioned International Security Assistance Force
("ISAF") began arriving in Kabul in accordance with the Bonn Agreement.
United Nations representatives refused to meet with US Army Civil Affairs
leaders if they were in uniform.
US Army Civil Affairs units have a long, distinguished history. They played
an indispensable role in the European Theater of Operations during and after
World War II, and in the postwar occupation of Japan. US Army and Marine
Corps Civic Action units played an equally indispensable humanitarian assistance
role during the Vietnam War.13 NGO involvement during those conflicts was
virtually non-existent (World War I)' 4 or extremely limited (Vietnam)."5
The Syrians claim that he's a prisoner of war. Well, I don't know how you
have a prisoner of war when there is no declared war between nations. I don't
think that makes you eligible for the Geneva accords [sic].
The White House, The President's News Conference of December 20, 1983, 19 Weekly Comp
Pres Docs 1729 (Dec 20, 1983). The day after the operation, however, this author had
cleared on a State Department cable forwarding a demarch6 to the United States
ambassador in Damascus, demanding prisoner of war protection for the captured aviator.
Upon receipt of that demarch6, the Syrians complied. See Department of State, 3
Cumulative Digest of United States Practice in International Law, 1981-1988 at 3456 (1995). The
one-hour air strike probably did not meet the general criteria for a war, but it did cross the
threshold for application of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War. Similarly, during the 1999 NATO Kosovo air operations, Serbian
forces captured three US Army soldiers. The initial response of the Secretary of State was
that these men were not prisoners of war, a point with which every member of the
Department of Defense Law of War Working Group strongly disagreed. The Secretary of
State subsequently agreed that the men were prisoners of war, another indication that
there is more than one threshold. W. Hays Parks, The United States Militagy and the Law of
War: Inculcating an Ethos, 69 Social Research 981, 1000 (2002).
12 Unlike their Special Forces counterparts, Civil Affairs personnel in indigenous attire did
not necessarily wear the Massoud pakol or scarf. Whether wearing western attire or
indigenous attire, some concealed their weapons.
13 See, for example, F.S.V. Donnison, British Military Administration in the Far East, 1943-46
(Her Majesty's Stationary Office ("HMSO") 1956); F.S.V. Donnison, Civil Affairs and
Military Government: North-West Europe, 1944-1946 (HMSO 1961); C.R.S. Harris, Allied
Military Administration of Italy, 1943-1945 (HMSO 1957); and F.S.V. Donnison, Civil
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Under the terms of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War ("GC"), NGOs operate subject
to the consent of relevant state parties to a conflict.16 The GC also contemplated
a linear battlefield in which NGOs could operate in secure areas, a combat
environment different from Afghanistan. Legally and operationally, military
operations and requirements take priority over NGO activities. However,
NGOs provide valuable services that the military might be expected or required
to perform were NGOs not present. Military commanders must give due
consideration to this, as NGO absence could add other responsibilities (such as
refugee care) to a military commander's burden. At the same time, NGOs
cannot expect a risk-free work environment. Military commanders are entitled to
make lawful mission-supporting decisions, even if those decisions might place
NGOs or other civilians at greater risk.
Service NGOs have become more significant players in areas of armed
conflict over the past decade. 7 A service NGO's emphasis is on mission
Affairs and Military Government: Central Organization and Planning (HMSO 1966) (each is a
part of the official British History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military
Series). US Army Civil Affairs operations in World War II are the subject of Harry L.
Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors (US Army in World
War 11, Special Studies series) (Department of the Army 1964) and Earl F. Ziemke, The
U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946 (Army Historical Series) (US Army
Center for Military History 1975). For Vietnam history, see, for example, Capt. Russel H.
Stolfi, U.S. Marine Corps Civic Action Efforts in Vietnam, March 1965-March 1966 (Historical
Branch, US Marine Corps 1968); Capt. William D. Parker, U.S. Marine Corps CivilAffairs
in I Cops, Republic of Vietnam, April 1966 to April 1967 (Historical Division, US Marine
Corps 1970).
14 While the International Committee of the Red Cross does not regard itself as a non-
governmental organization, it is in many respects the quintessential NGO and one of few
NGOs operating during World War II. For its role in that conflict, see Report of the
International Committee of the Red Cross on Its Activities during the Second World War, September 1,
1939-June 30, 1947 (International Committee of the Red Cross 1948).
15 See Maj. Gen. George S. Prugh, Law at War: Vietnam, 1964-1973 at 65-66, 68-72, 76, 78,
116 (Department of the Army 1975), which mentions only work with the International
Committee of the Red Cross. The only other NGO seen by this author during his
Vietnam service (1968-1969) was the American National Red Cross, which played a
limited but important role.
16 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art 10
(1949), 6 UST 3516. "The provisions of the present Convention constitute no obstacle to
the humanitarian activities which the International Committee of the Red Cross or any
other impartial humanitarian organization may, subject to the consent of the Parties to the conflict
concerned, undertake for the protection of civilian persons and for their relief.') (emphasis
added). See also Dietrich Schindler and Jii Toman, eds, The Laws of Armed Conflicts 504
(Martinus Nijhoff 3d ed 1988).
17 The author distinguishes between service NGOs, whose primary purpose is to provide
humanitarian assistance in areas of strife and/or natural disaster, and advocacy NGOs,
which are solely political action groups (self-proclaimed "human rights groups").
Examples of the former include the International Committee of the Red Cross, Midecins
Fall 2003
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performance following the principles of humanity, impartiality, independence
and neutrality. These NGOs feel obliged to maintain independence from the
agendas of both the donors that fund them and governments and local
authorities that allow them to operate in their territories. In contrast, advocacy
NGOs see CA's engagement in assistance activities as driven by political and
security objectives.
The US military leadership was not entirely successful in seeking dialogue,
much less working relationships, with NGOs in Afghanistan. The relationship
was particularly bad as US Army Civil Affairs arrived in Afghanistan. Civil
Affairs personnel were denied access to NGO meetings, while some NGOs
refused to come to CJCMOTF-hosted meetings. A senior on-scene Army Civil
Affairs officer concluded that the key concern was NGO image and market
share. NGOs that had worked in Afghanistan since the 1980s feared being
upstaged by the Army's Civil Humanitarian and Liaison Cells ("CHLC"). The
NGOs also objected to the use of humanitarian projects in support of a military
campaign.
The CJCMOTF served as liaison to the interim government and
supervised the humanitarian assistance for US Army Civil Affairs teams
beginning to operate throughout Afghanistan. Civil Affairs personnel were
deployed across Afghanistan to assess and identify projects for some $2 million
in initial aid money. The money went directly to local contractors. NGOs
wanted to be subcontracted. Based on limited money, the need to have an
immediate impact, and concern about whether such use of these funds was
permissible, US Army Civil Affairs leadership informed the NGOs that it would
not subcontract to them. Moreover, due to security concerns, NGOs were in the
main cities but not in the villages where Civil Affairs teams operated. Going
directly to local contractors increased the fear of some NGOs that they would
lose "market share."
There was friction also with respect to fiscal accountability. US Army Civil
Affairs is expected to account for 100 percent of the funds it is allocated. A
substantial amount of NGOs' fundingm-sometimes as much as 60 percent-is
directed to "overhead," preventing its allocation toward the designated project
and hindering accountability. NGOs resent scrutiny of their financial affairs and
high overhead. This resistance increased tension between US Army Civil Affairs
and the NGOs.
Social reform was another source of tension. Contrary to claims of
neutrality and impartiality, 8 many NGOs in Afghanistan moved into advocacy
sans Frontiires (Doctors Without Borders), and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation.
Primary examples of the latter are Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International.
18 The International Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC") defines neutrali. "In order to
continue to enjoy the confidence of all, the Red Cross may not take sides in hostilities or
engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature."
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of women's rights and human rights. This caused friction with US Army Civil
Affairs, whose role is to provide humanitarian relief without interference in local
customs, however objectionable they may be. Civil Affairs work stifled NGOs'
agendas on non-humanitarian issues.
An amicable although uneven relationship evolved between CA and
NGOs at the working, "grassroots" level. This contrasts with the poor
relationship at higher levels due to the conflicts identified above. NGOs'
resentment of US Army Civil Affairs and market share concerns apparently
prompted the NGO complaint-led by Midecins sans Fronfires-regarding Civil
Affairs wear of civilian clothing.'9 Philosophical differences between NGOs and
the military are inevitable. The uniform/civilian clothes issue was symptomatic
of a larger issue. It should be noted that not all NGOs agreed with the
complaint made by Midecins sans Fronfires.
In early March 2002, the CJCMOTF commander, desiring to broker a
compromise, directed all Civil Affairs personnel in Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif to
return to full uniform. Some Civil Affairs personnel in remote locations (where
NGOs would not work due to the risk) were permitted to stay in civilian attire.
On March 19th, following its review, USCENTCOM supported CJCMOTF's
decision. Guidance and authority were provided to ground force commanders to
establish uniform policies based upon local threat conditions and force
protection requirements.
As a result of the NGOs' complaints the issue of military wear of civilian
clothing was reviewed within the Department of Defense ("DoD"). Following
DoD-Joint Chiefs of Staff coordination, guidance was forwarded to
Imparialiy means that "[the ICRC] makes no discrimination as to nationality, race,
religious beliefs, class or political opinions." International Red Cross Handbook 17 (ICRC
12th ed 1983). These are fundamental principles of the ICRC, approved by governments
at the XX International Conference of the Red Cross, Vienna, 1965. Offering the ICRC
definitions is not intended to suggest that the comments contained in the main text
sentence are directed at the ICRC.
19 The NGO civilian clothing complaint was directed at Civil Affairs units and personnel
only. Speaking at a Harvard University Cart Center Symposium, Army-Navy Club,
Washington, October 18, 2002, Nicolas de Torrente, representative of the NGO Mdedns
sans Froniires (Doctors Without Borders) (hereinafter "MSF"), made it clear that the
NGO complaint was directed only at US Army Civil Affairs personnel operating in
proximity to NGOs. He emphasized that MSF offered no objection as to the attire of US
or Coalition Special Forces engaged in counter-terrorist operations against Taliban/al
Qaeda (personal knowledge of the author, who was present).
During the question and answer period, this author offered the counterargument
that NGO personnel working in proximity to uniformed CA personnel might be at
greater risk of being targeted because of an appearance of overt support for US
operations, or as collateral casualties incidental to al Qaeda attacks on uniformed Civil
Affairs personnel performing humanitarian relief operations. Mr. Torrente acknowledged
the counterargument before stating that MSF objected to the presence of any military
personnel in proximity to MSF activities.
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USCENTCOM in May 2002 that was consistent with CJCMOTF guidance
issued on April 7, 2002. As a result of CENTCOM/CJCMOTF guidance, the
number of Civil Affairs and other Special Operations Forces ("SOF") personnel
in civilian clothing had diminished substantially prior to DoD-JCS action or the
aforementioned USSOCOM Legal Conference.2 °
20 Six months later the Commanding General, US Army Special Forces Command
("USASFC") issued an order reinstating standard uniform and grooming practices that
received wide media coverage. See, for example, Kitty Kay, Close Shave for Special Forces,
Times (London) Overseas News 17 (Sept 13, 2002); Mike Mount, Close Shave for Special
Ops Forces in Afghanistan, CNN (Sept 13, 2002), available online through
<http://www.cnn.com> (visited Oct 17, 2003); and Headquarters CJSOTF Afghanistan
Memorandum, Subject: Uniform and Appearance Standards Policy - Rescinding of
Relaxed Grooming Standards (Sept 6, 2002). According to the Staff Judge Advocate for
US Army Special Forces Command, the commander's intent was for field commanders
to review the appropriateness of continued wear of non-standard uniforms and beards,
particularly by support personnel not engaged in combat missions. This is borne out by
reports the author received from special mission units judge advocates, who advised that
bearded special mission unit personnel in non-standard uniforms subsequently briefed
the Combatant Commander (Commander, US Central Command). The USASFC order
was a general tightening of discipline and uniform standards where there was no military
necessity for wearing either beards or non-standard uniforms. The author is indebted to
Lieutenant Colonel Margaret M. Bedard, JA, USA, and Captain Robert A. Broadbent, JA,
USA, US Army Special Forces Command, and lieutenant Colonel Kevin H. Govern, JA,
USA, for the information contained in this footnote.
Special Mission Unit personnel operating against al Qaeda grew beards for several
reasons: (1) a dearth of water for daily shaving; (2) for rapport with and to appear like the
indigenous personnel with whom they were serving; and (3) to protect them from
identification and their families from terrorist attacks. The latter rationale is not new. In
1918, then-lieutenant Colonel T.E. Lawrence was publicly identified as a leader in the
Arab Revolt. His biographer explains:
As soon as these reports began to appear, the Censorship and Press
Committee in London issued a warning to editors which read: "The Press are
earnestly requested not to publish any photograph of Lieutenant-Colonel T.E.
Lawrence, C.B., D.S.O. This officer is not known by sight to the Turks, who
have put a price upon his head, and any photograph or personal description of
him may endanger his safety."
Wilson, Lawrence ofArabia at 552 (cited in note 7).
As somewhat of an aside and a comparative precedent, the reader is invited to
examine the photograph of a bearded Captain Leon de Meis, US Army, a member of
OSS Team IBEX in Hainan, northern China, in 1945, which shows him shirtless and in
non-standard trousers, with a bandoleer of ammunition across his chest. Bank, From OSS
to Green Berets at 62-63 (photo section) (cited in note 5). Similarly, British military
personnel assigned to Special Operations Executive, changed from civilian clothing into
uniform as their individual missions transitioned from clandestine operations into the
paramilitary guerrilla phase. Douglas Dodds-Parker, Setting Europe AblaZe 145
(Springwood 1983). Similarly, OSS Operational Teams in China wore US uniforms,
Chinese uniforms, Chinese Puppet Army (enemy) uniforms, or indigenous civilian attire,
depending on the tactical situation. Mills, Mills, and Brunner, OSS Special Operations in
China at 12, 90, 213-14, 217-18, 234, 270, 281, 284, 287, 294, 392 (cited in note 7). In
Lawrence's case and the World War II cases, identification risks were limited to the
battlefield. With ease of travel and the global threat of terrorism, the identity of special
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II. WHAT ARE THE LEGAL ISSUES?
Considering an issue in the public sector, including the military, is similar
to private practice or a law school examination. The legal issues have to be
identified and addressed. In weighing the situation at hand, the following legal
issues were identified:
A. Is it lawful for combatants to wear civilian clothing or non-standard
uniforms in combat?
B. If so, are there legal restrictions in use of either?
C. Are there unique law of war considerations, such as risks, which a
commander should balance in making his decision?
Other questions had to be answered prior to answering the above
questions.
III. WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE ARMED CONFLICT,
AND ITS ARMED PARTICIPANTS?
The nature of the armed conflict in Afghanistan was an issue that
prompted considerable discussion within and outside the government, in large
measure due to the nature of the enemy.
References to al Qaeda and the Taliban as separate entities constituted an
incomplete and inaccurate picture. The enemy consisted of a loose
amalgamation of at least three groups: the Taliban regime (until its December
2001 collapse, following which it reverted to its tribal origins), the al Qaeda
terrorist group, used as the Praetorian Guard for the Taliban leadership (both
for internal security prior to and following commencement of US/Coalition
operations), and foreign Taliban. The picture was further complicated by the
tendency of some to refer to the Taliban as the de facto government of
Afghanistan, because it exercised rough control over 80 percent of Afghanistan.
This was open to debate until the collapse of the Taliban, at which time it ceased
to be an issue. Until the collapse of the Taliban regime in December 2001, a
strong case could be made that this was an internal conflict between non-state
actors in a failed state.21 By the time Army Civil Affairs entered Afghanistan, the
case was absolute.
mission personnel is classified to protect them and their families. This practice has existed
for some time; see, for example, photographs contained in Peter Ratcliffe, with Noel
Botham and Brian Hitchen, Eye of the Storm (Michael O'Mara 2000), where the faces of
current members of Special Air Services ("SAS") are obscured.
21 The section that follows (including the text of this footnote) was prepared from materials
provided by the Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations, US Army
War College, US Army Peacekeeping Institute, the Department of State, and Ahmed
Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (Yale 2000). The
author also is indebted to Lieutenant Colonel Kirby Abbott, Chief, International and
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Operational Law Division, Office of the Judge Advocate General, Canada, for his
contributions to the analysis in this section.
Arguments with respect to the Taliban militia (as they called themselves) depend
only so slightly on who and when. The Taliban was a loose amalgamation of occasional and
disparate tribal and other factions. It was a faction engaged in a civil war in a failed state
that owed much of its strength and origin to the Pakistani Intelligence Service. It
exercised none of the usual activities of a government, other than the negative one of
closing down all schools. The Taliban militia never claimed to be the Afghanistan
government or armed forces. The Taliban had no uniformed armed forces. The Taliban
was structured around tribes rather than as a military unit, recruiting the allegiance of
other tribes or personnel from other tribes and private citizens through temporary
alliances, defections, bribery, and conscription, while also relying on foreign volunteers.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the break-up of Yugoslavia, the
international test has been whether an entity is permitted to sit behind the nameplate in
the United Nations (and in other international fora) rather than the previous test of
whether it controls population, territory, etc. The Taliban was never permitted to
represent Afghanistan at the United Nations or in other international fora.
The UN Security Council never recognized Taliban as the representative of
Afghanistan. In a number of UN Security Council resolutions issued against the Taliban,
there was discussion as to whether a binding resolution could be issued against a non-
state entity. These Security Council resolutions included 1189 (1999), 1267 (1999) and
1363 (2001). Security Council resolution 1189 referred to "the continuing use of Afghan
territory, especially areas controlled by the Taliban;" hence the Security Council
distinguished between the Taliban and Afghanistan.
Prior to September 11, 2001, the Taliban was recognized only by Saudi Arabia,
Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates. All three withdrew their recognition following
the terrorist attack. Stated another way, 98.5 percent of the world's governments,
including the United States, did not recognize the Taliban as the government of
Afghanistan prior to the September 11, 2001 al Qaeda attack. Nor was it recognized by
the League of Islamic Nations, nor by Switzerland (depositary of the Geneva
Conventions). The Taliban was not invited to the 1999 Conference of Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies as the Afghanistan representative. Had it been invited, it is likely the
US and other governments would have prevented it from occupying the Afghanistan
delegation seat, as was the case with respect to the FRY in Yugoslavia. By the time
Coalition operations began in Afghanistan, no government recognized the Taliban as the
government of Afghanistan.
Once US and allied operations began in Afghanistan in October 2001, al Qaeda
assumed command of most Taliban militia units. As the battle continued, most Taliban
withdrew to their normal areas of Afghanistan, leaving the fighting to al Qaeda and
foreign members of the Taliban. Any perception of the Taliban as any sort of a national
government dissolved following Taliban abandonment of Kabul (Nov 12, 2001) and the
US capture of Kandahar (Dec 10, 2001).
A leading authority, in discussing guerrillas, summed up the Taliban militia and al
Qaeda status:
The law of nations, apart from the Hague Regulations . . . denies belligerent
qualifications to guerrilla bands. Such forces wage a warfare which is irregular
in point of origin and authority, of discipline, of purpose and procedure. They
may be constituted at the beck of a single individual; they lack uniforms; they
are given to pillage and destruction; they take few prisoners and are hence
disposed to show slight quarter.
Charles Cheney Hyde, 2 International Law: Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States
§ 652 (Little, Brown 1922).
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Another factor was that the United States and its Coalition partners were
engaged in military operations in a foreign nation. Hence, regardless of the status
of the Taliban, an argument could be made that for certain purposes this was an
international armed conflict. However, by the time the uniform issue was raised
by NGOs and considered in Washington, the conflict against the Taliban and al
Qaeda looked more like a counterinsurgency campaign or counterterrorist
operation than an international armed conflict. While the Administration chose
to apply the law of war applicable in international armed conflicts as a template
for US conduct," it would be incorrect to conclude that all of the law of war for
international armed conflicts was applicable. For example, neither the Taliban
nor al Qaeda personnel were regarded as entitled to prisoner of war status.23
Nonetheless, the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War of August 12, 1949, proved a useful template for their treatment.
This issue was not entirely new. US and other military forces engaged in
the various peacekeeping and other peace operations during the 1990s frequently
sought to ascertain where they were along the conflict spectrum. From the
standpoint of US military conduct, the issue made little difference. DoD policy
is that US military personnel will comply with the law of war during all armed
conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized, and with the principles and
spirit of the law of war during all other operations.24 The primary issue in US
and Coalition operations against al Qaeda and the Taliban was whether captured
al Qaeda and Taliban were entitled to prisoner of war status under the Geneva
22 See, for example, President's Military Order, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War on Terrorism, 66 Fed Reg 57833, 1(a) (Nov 13, 2001) (hereinafter
Military Order).
23 Press Briefing by Ad Fleischer (February 7, 2002), available online at
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020207-6.html> (visited Sept
21, 2003); Katherine Q. Seelye, In Shift, Bush Says Geneva Rules Fit Taliban Captives, NY
Times Al (Feb 8, 2002). The issues are summarized in John C. Yoo and James C. Ho,
InternationalLaw and the War on Terrorism, Va J Intl L (forthcoming Fall 2003).
24 DoD Law of War Program, DoD Directive 5100.77 at 5.3.1 (Dec 9, 1998); Implementation of
the DoD Law of War Program, CJCSI 5810.01A at I 5a (Aug 27, 1999). For this reason, the
decision was announced that the United States would apply the law of war applicable in
international armed conflict to non-state actors in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.
See Anthony Dworkin, Exceipt from Interview with Charles Allen, Deputy General Counsel for
International Affairs, US Department of Defense, Crimes of War Project, (Dec 16, 2002),
available online at <http://www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/news-pentagon-trans.html>
(visited Sept 21, 2003). This announcement was greeted with astonishment by some
international law experts. See, for example, Marco Sassoli, 'nlawful Combatants:" The
Existing Law and Whether It Needs to Be Revised, Conference on Current Issues in
International Law and Military Operations 1, US Naval War College (June 25-27, 2003).
Comments similar to Professor Sassoli's were offered privately to the author by his
foreign military counterparts. As will be indicated, the intention was to use the law of war
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Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949
("GPW") 25 which, as indicated in note 23, had been decided.
IV. WHAT IS THE RELEVANT LAW?
In a speech at the United States Institute of Peace on March 1, 2001, Sir
Adam Roberts declared "lawyers stick to the safe anchor of treaties. 26 This
perhaps is a more erudite way of expressing the adage, "If the only tool you have
is a hammer, every problem is viewed as a nail." So it was in the debate over
SOF wear of non-standard uniforms. The argument against non-standard
uniforms primarily was cast in terms of the GPW. The author frequently heard
critics argue that "in accordance with" the GPW, (a) SOF were required to wear
uniforms; (b) failure to wear uniforms was a war crime; and (c) SOF had to wear
uniforms and treat captured al Qaeda and Taliban as enemy prisoners of war in
the hope of reciprocity should any SOF fall into enemy hands.27 A closer
examination of the law reveals (a) and (b) to be legally incorrect, while (c) was
highly speculative at best with respect to al Qaeda and Taliban conduct.
The GPW and its predecessors contain no language requiring military
personnel to wear a uniform, nor prohibiting them from fighting in something
other than full, standard uniform. Nor does it make it a war crime not to wear a
uniform. Article 4 lists persons entitled to prisoner of war status and subject to
the protections set forth in the GPW. It states in part:
A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons
belonging to one of the following categories, who have fallen into the
power of the enemy:
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as
members of militias and volunteer corps forming part of such
armed forces.
(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer
corps, including those of organized resistance movements,
belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside
their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided
that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized
resistance movements, fulfill the following conditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a
distance;
25 6 UST 3316 (hereinafter GPW).
26 Sir Adam Roberts, Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law. Challenges for the UN
Security Council and the USA, Speech at the US Institute of Peace (Mar 1, 2001) (personal
knowledge of author, who was present).
27 Personal knowledge of author as a participant in numerous official meetings and
discussions with various NGOs.
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(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the
laws and customs of war.
28
Differing views as to whether regular force combatants are expected or
required to meet the four criteria contained in Article 4A(2) are beyond this
Article's scope. While history, the negotiating history of article 4 and predecessor
treaties, other provisions in the GPW, and recognized experts strongly suggest
that regular force combatants are entitled to prisoner of war status once they are
identified as members of the regular forces (however attired when captured),29
28 GPW art 4 (cited in note 25).
29 Historically, regular military forces' entitlement to prisoner of war status has been
absolute and unqualified. Article 49 of US General Orders No. 100 (1863) states:
All soldiers, of whatever species of arms ... all disabled men or officers on the
field or elsewhere, if captured ... are prisoners of war, and as such exposed to
the inconveniences as well as entitled to the privileges of a prisoner of war.
Schindler and Toman, Laws of Armed Conflicts at 10-11 (cited in note 16). Similarly, Jean
Pictet's ICRC Commentagy states:
Once one is accorded the status of a belligerent, one is bound by the
obligations of the laws of war, and entitled to the rights which they confer.
The most important of these is the right, following capture, to be recognized
as a prisoner of war, and to be treated accordingly.
Jean Pictet, ed, The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary: III Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 46-47 (ICRC 1960) (A.P. de Heney, trans)
(hereinafter Commentay on the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War).
Entitlement to prisoner of war status for members of the armed forces existed
without pre-condition in treaty law. Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, Annex art 1 (1907), 36 Stat 2277 (hereinafter Hague
Convention IV); GPW art 4(A)l (cited in note 25). William E. S. Flory, Prisoners of War
27-28 (American Council on Public Affairs 1942), states:
Persons serving in the regular army, navy and air force of a belligerent state
have rights as prisoners of war when they fall into the hands of the enemy.
This rule is part of customary international law as well as treaty law.
Similarly, G.I.A.D. Draper, comments:
Article I of the Hague Regulations, and its four express and two implicit
stringent conditions for volunteer and militia corps, represented a triumph for
the "military" faction at the Hague Peace Conference. Those four express
conditions: (i) a commander responsible for his subordinates, (ii) distinctive
sign, (iii) open carrying of arms and (iv) compliance with the Laws of War in
their operations, enable an extension of the class of the privileged belligerent
by way of identification to the normal features of military armed forces. This
identification is not absolute. Members of the armed forces who persistently violate the
Law of War do not lose their POW status upon capture. The effect of Articles of [sic] 4, 5
and 85 of the Geneva (POW) Convention, 1949, makes this clear.
G.I.A.D. Draper The Present Law as to Combatangy, in Michael A. Meyer and Hilaire
McCoubrey, eds, Reflections on Law and Armed Conflicts: The Selected Works on the Laws of War
by the Late Professor Colonel G.LA.D. Draper, OBE 197 (Kluwer Law 1998) (emphasis
added). Denial to regular forces (including special operations forces) of prisoner of war
status and the protections of the 1929 GPW, predecessor to the current GPW, were held
to be war crimes by post-World War II tribunals, including in cases where British and
American military personnel were summarily executed. On October 18, 1942, in response
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other experts argue that the 4A(2) criteria are prerequisites for prisoner of war
status for regular force personnel as' well as militia members. 0 Court cases, while
limited in number, tend to support the latter point of view.3" Article 46 of the
to British special forces missions, Adolf Hider issued his Fiihrerbefehl ("Commando
Order'), which declared that Allied special forces, even if uniformed members of the
armed forces, were to be "slaughtered to the last man" (that is, denied quarter, in
violation of Article 23(d) of the Annex to the Hague Convention IV) or, if captured,
denied prisoner of war status and summarily executed. The "Commando Order" was
declared a war crime at Nuremberg. Office of United States Chief of Counsel for
Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazj Conspiracy and Aggression: Opinion and Judgment 58
(GPO 1947). Its implementation resulted in war crimes convictions by United States
military tribunals (In re Dostler, in 1 Law Reports of Trial of War Criminals 22, 22-34 (HMSO
1945)), and by British military courts (Trial of Generaloberst Nickolaus von Falkenhorst, in 11
Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 18, 18-30 (HMSO 1949), and Trial of Karl Buck and
Ten Others, in 5 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 39, 39-44 (HMSO 1948)).
In the Dostler case, two officers and thirteen enlisted men from Unit A, 1st
Contingent (OSS Operational Group, Italy) were captured on March 22, 1944, and
executed under orders from Major General Dostler, even though they had been captured
in uniform. Dostler was tried, convicted and executed by firing squad following World
War II. 1 Law Reports of Trial of War Criminals at 22 (cited above). See also photographic
evidence in author's possession. Other OSS Operational Groups sewed Seventh US
Army patches on their left shoulders to conceal their OSS identity. Ian Sutherland, The
OSS Operational Groups: Origin ofArmy Spedal Forces, 2 Special Warfare 2, 3 (Summer 2002).
30 In International Law and the War on Terrorism, Yoo and Ho argue that the four criteria
contained in Article 4A(2), GPW are prerequisites to prisoner of war status for regular
force combatants. Va J Intl L (cited in note 23) That view is not consistent with Articles
5, 85 and 93 of the GPW or the negotiating history of the four criteria; see, for example,
Draper, The Present Law as to Combatangy at 197 (cited in note 29); and Jiff Toman, The
Status of al Qaeda/ Taliban Detainees under the Geneva Conventions, 32 Israeli Yearbook on
Human Rights 271, 283, 285 (2002) (on file with author).
31 An element of inconsistency with customary and treaty law evolved within the United
States during World War II as a result of dicta in the opinion by the United States
Supreme Court in Exparte Quirin, 317 US 1 (1942), involving the trial of eight Nazi
saboteurs captured in civilian clothing in the United States. Changes in treaty law and US
practice since .Quirin for the most part have returned US interpretation to the pre-.Quiin
position, albeit muddied by the experience and two subsequent Singapore cases
(discussed below) that followedQuirin.
Quirin is lacking with respect to some of its law of war scholarship. Review of the
Court's citation of Field Manual 27-10, Rules of Land Wafare (US War Department 1914
and 1940) suggests that the Court apparently confused provisions relating to civilians
taking a direct part in hostilities, who would be unprivileged belligerents, and those
relating to actions by military personnel, who remain entitled to prisoner of war status.
The Court correctly stated, citing 83 of US Army General Orders No 100 (1863), that
soldiers "disguised in the dress of the country ... if found .. .lurking about the lines of
the captor, are treated as spies, and suffer death." ExparteQuiin, 317 US at 32. This
provision is consistent with Article 29 of the Annex to the Hague Convention IV.
However, the Court failed to note 203 of Field Manual 27-10, Rules of Land Warfare
(1940), which states that spies are not punished as "violators of the law of war." Rather,
the Court erred in stating that "the absence of uniform ... renders the offender liable to
trial for violation of the laws [sic] of war." ExparteQuirin, 317 US at 35-36 n12. The
statement has no basis in the law of war. It is contrary to Article 31 of the Annex to the
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1977 Additional Protocol I denies prisoner of war protection to spies, even if
they have been identified as regular members of the military.32
Hague Convention IV (cited in note 29) (a treaty to which the United States was a party
during World War II), which states that "[a] spy who, after rejoining the army to which
he belongs, is subsequently captured by the enemy, is treated as a prisoner of war, and
incurs no responsibility for his previous acts of espionage." Were absence of uniform a
violation of the law of war, criminal liability would remain even after a soldier returned
safely to his own lines. Similarly, a commander who orders military personnel to carry out
a mission in civilian clothing would incur no criminal liability for his order. J.M. Spaight,
Air Power and War Rights 287 (Longmans, Green 2d ed 1933).
For a summary of the German operation, trial of the saboteurs, and critical analysis
of Quinin, see Louis Fisher, Nazi Saboteurs on Trial A Military Tribunal and American Law
(Kansas 2003).
Two cases from Singapore follow the reasoning of Quirin. The facts of each are
similar. During armed conflict between Indonesia and Singapore, Indonesian soldiers in
civilian clothing entered Singapore on sabotage missions. The courts determined that
while entitled to prisoner of war status under Article 4A(1), GPW, that entitlement was
forfeited when the soldiers executed their missions in civilian clothing. In both cases the
defendants were charged with domestic law violations rather than violation of the law of
war. Stanislaus Krofan &Another v Public Prosecutor, [1967] 1 Malayan L J 133 (Fed Ct Cr
App 1966) (Singapore), and Osman Bin Haji Mohamed Ali v Public Prosecutor, 1 AC 430
(Privy Council 1969) (appeal taken from Malaysia) (UK).
See also Militagy Prosecutor v Omar Mabmud Kassem and Others (Israel Military Court
sitting in Ramalah 1969), published in Law and Courts in the Israel-held Areas 17 (Hebrew
University 1970), which contains similar conclusions but is distinguishable in that it
involved non-strte actors.
32 Members of the military captured behind enemy lines wearing civilian clothing may be
denied prisoner of war status and may be subject to trial for espionage under the
domestic law of the captor government, but are not subject to prosecution if
subsequently captured in uniform after safely returning from the espionage mission.
Articles 29 and 31 of the Annex to the Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land of October 18, 1907, state:
Art. 29. A person can only be considered a spy when, acting clandestinely or
on false pretenses, he obtains or endeavours to obtain information in the zone
of operations of a belligerent, with the intention of communicating it to the
hostile party.
Thus soldiers not wearing a disguise who have penetrated into the zone
of operations of the hostile army for the purpose of obtaining information are
not considered spies.
Art. 31. A spy who, after rejoining the army to which he belongs, is
subsequently captured by the enemy, is treated as a prisoner of war, and incurs
no responsibility for his previous acts of espionage.
36 Stat 2277 (cited in note 29).
Article 46 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I provides:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of the Conventions or of this Protocol,
any member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict who falls into the
power of an adverse Party while engaging in espionage shall not have the right
to status of prisoner of war and may be treated as a spy.
16 ILM 1391, 1411 (1977).
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Historical state practice, discussed in Section IV.B. and the Appendix,
suggests that denial of prisoner of war status is not automatic, while the
experience of US military personnel captured even when in uniform has been
one of refusal of the captor to provide prisoner of war status and/or suffering
serious abuse.33 Past abuses of captured US military and civilian personnel do
not constitute either justification or an argument for military personnel to
abandon standard uniforms. In international armed conflict, standard uniforms
should be the norm; non-standard uniforms, the rare exception; civilian attire,
even rarer. But risk of denial of prisoner of war status, while a serious
consideration, does not answer the commander's question: Is wearing something
less than standard uniform illegal? The answer in treaty law and state practice is
clear: Wearing a partial uniform, or even civilian clothing, is illegal only if it
Participants in the negotiation of Article 46 argue that this language was intended
to re-codify the provisions of Articles 29 and 31 of the Annex to the Hague Convention
IV. Michael Bothe, Karl Josef Partsch, and Waldemar A. Solf, New Rules for Victims of
Armed Conflicts 264-65 (Martinus Nijhoff 1982). Article 46 goes beyond previous law in
denying prisoner of war status to military personnel captured while engaged in spying, but
is generally consistent with state practice, noted in Section IV.C. That the United States is
not a state party to Additional Protocol I is not germane, inasmuch as consideration must
be given to enemy actions towards US military personnel captured in civilian attire.
The provisions of the 1907 Hague Convention IV and the 1977 Additional
Protocol I do not make spying a war crime. Rather, denial of prisoner of war status and
the death penalty are regarded as long-standing deterrents to spying; see W. Hays Parks,
International Law of Intelligence Collection, in John Norton Moore, Frederick S. Tipson, and
Robert F. Turner, National Security Law 433, 435 (Carolina 1990).
33 See, for example, Trial of Lieutenant-General Shigern Sawada and Three Others, in 5 Law Reports
of Trials of War Criminals I (HMSO 1948) (denial of prisoner of war status to and
execution of eight US Army Air Corps personnel); and In re Dostler (cited in note 29).
US military personnel captured in uniform during the Vietnam war were illegally
denied prisoner of war status by their captors and routinely tortured. Guenter Lewy,
America in Vietnam 332-34 (Oxford 1978); Howard S. Levie, Maltreatment of Prisoners of War
in Vietnam, in Richard A. Falk, ed, 2 The Vietnam War and International Law 361, 382
(Princeton 1969); Stuart I. Rochester and Frederick Kiley, Honor Bound: The History of
American Prisoners of War in Southeast Asia, 1961-1973 at 188-94, 199-207 (Department of
Defense 1998); and Vernon E. Davis, The Long Road Home: U.S. Prisoner of War Poliy and
Planning in Southeast Asia 5, 64-84 (Historical Office, Secretary of Defense 1998). Three
representative personal accounts detailing the torture and other violations of the GPW
are Robinson Risner, The Passing of the Night: My Seven Years as a Prisoner of the North
Vietnamese (Random House 1973); Sen. Jeremiah A. Denton, Jr., When Hell Was in Session
(Reader's Digest 1976) (reprinted by Robert E. Hopper 1982); and Col. George E. Day,
USAF (Ret.), Return with Honor (Champlin Museum 1989).
US and Coalition prisoners of war captured by Iraq during the 1991 war to liberate
Kuwait were not provided prisoner of war treatment, and were routinely tortured. Final
Report to Congress: Conduct of the Persian Gulf War 619-20 (Department of Defense 1992);
Office of General Counsel, Department of Defense, Memorandum for the Judge AdvocateGeneral, Department of the Army Report on Iraqi War Crimes (Desert Shield/Desert Storm) 11-12
(Mar 12, 1993) (Department of the Army 1993) (unclassified version prepared for the
Department of State, on file with CJIL) (original Memorandum on file with author).
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involves perfidy, discussed in Section IV.B. Military personnel wearing non-
standard uniform or civilian clothing are entitled to prisoner of war status if
captured. Those captured wearing civilian clothing may be at risk of denial of
prisoner of war status and trial as spies.
There is no doubt that in an international armed conflict any commander
will, and should, weigh a decision to authorize the wearing of civilian clothing
carefully. That being said, military personnel are in a high-risk profession, and
commanders often must make life-and-death decisions. Under most
circumstances, a commander ordering a frontal infantry assault on a heavily
fortified position understands that in doing so, he has accepted that some
soldiers are likely to lose their lives in carrying out his order. Similarly,
individuals who join the military should be under no illusion as to the attendant
risks. As British Special Operations Executive historian M.R.D. Foot
acknowledged, "The truth is that wars are dangerous, and people who fight in
them are liable to be killed.
' 34
The decision to wear something other than a standard uniform first
requires military necessity. At issue then is what constitutes a "non-standard
uniform." If a commander provides military necessity for a Special Forces team
to conduct operations in international arms conflict in something other than
standard uniform, what steps are necessary to comply with the law of war? What
guidance, if any, does the law of war provide as to what might constitute a "non-
standard uniform?" Also, what is "treacherous" killing, prohibited by Article
23(b), Annex to the 1907 Hague IV?
At the heart of the issue is the law of war principle of distinction. The law of
war divides the population of nations at war into the belligerent forces and
civilians not taking an active or direct part in hostilities.35 With a single, limited
exception,36 only military forces may engage directly or actively in hostilities, that
34 M.R.D. Foot, SOE in France: An Account of the British Special Operations Executive in France,
1940-44 at 20 (HMSO 1966).
35 For example, US War Department Field Manual 27-10, Rules of Land Warfare 4 states:
"The enemy population is divided in war into two general classes, known as the armed
forces and the peaceful population. Both classes have distinct rights, duties, and disabilities,
and no person can belong to both classes at one and the same time." (cited in note 31)
(emphasis in original). See also War Office [UK], Manual of Military Law 7 (War Office
1929) ("The division of the population of a belligerent State into two classes, namely, the
armed forces and the peaceful population, has already been mentioned. ... It is one of
the purposes of the laws of war to ensure that an individual who belongs to one class or
the other shall not be permitted to enjoy the privileges of both."). See also War Office
[UK], The Law of War on Land, Being Part III of the Manual of Militay Law 30 86 (HMSO
1958) (the current British law of war manual). Belligerent is the classical term. More
recently belligerents have been referred to as combatants, as medical personnel and chaplains
are part of belligerent forces but are non-combatants.
36 The levee en masse which, as defined in Article 2 of the Annex to the Hague Convention IV
(cited in note 29), is "the inhabitants of a territory [not under occupation] who, on the
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is, in combatant-like activities. Hostile acts by private citizens are not lawful, and
are punishable, in order to protect innocent civilians from harm.37 Civilians, and
the civilian population, are protected from intentional attack so long as they do
not take an active or direct part in hostilities. In turn, military forces are
obligated to take reasonable measures to separate themselves from the civilian
population and civilian objects, to distinguish innocent civilians from civilians
engaged in hostile acts, and to distinguish themselves from the civilian
population so as not to place the civilian population at undue risk. This includes
not only physical separation of military forces and other military objectives from
civilian objects and the civilian population as such, but also other actions, such
as wearing uniforms. An early 20th century law of war scholar observed:
The separation of armies and peaceful inhabitants into two distinct classes is
perhaps the greatest triumph of International Law. Its effect in mitigating
the evils of war has been incalculable. 38
Another law of war scholar summarizes the principle of dislinction in the
following way:
It may be said that the principle ... of distinction between belligerents and
civilian population, had found acceptance as a self-evident rule of customary
law in the second half of the 19th century. Indeed, it seems no more than a
reflection of practice as demonstrated in many of the wars fought in Europe
in that period. Soldiers were not merely distinguishable: they were
conspicuous in their proud uniforms; and armies fought each other, and
preferred the civilian population not to mingle in their business.39
State practice and treaty development make it clear that the principle is
neither absolute nor rigid. Wearing civilian clothing for intelligence collection is
acknowledged in treaty law as a lawful military activity. SOF wearing civilian
clothing while serving with partisans was common state practice in World War
II and codified in subsequent treaties or their negotiating records, as will be
shown in Section IV.B. The ancillary law of war prohibition on "killing
treacherously"4° does not preclude lawful ruses or Special Forces' wearing non-
standard uniforms, or openly fighting in civilian attire with no intent to conceal
their combatant status.4'
approach of the enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading troops without
having had time to organize themselves." Treaty recognition of the levee en masse
constituted a first step in relaxation of the principle of distinction.
37 L. Oppenheim, Disputes, War and Neutraliy, 2 International Law. A Treatise 206 (Longmans,
Green 7th ed 1952) (H. Lauterpacht, ed).
38 J.M. Spaight, War Rights on Land 37 (Macfillan 1911).
39 Frits Kalshoven, The Law of Warfare 31 (A.W. Sijthoff 1973).
40 Article 23(b) of the Annex to the Hague Convention IV (cited in note 29) states that it is
prohibited "to kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or
army.
41 Article 24 of the Annex to the Hague Convention IV (cited in note 29) states: "Ruses of
war and the employment of measures necessary for obtaining information about the
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A. WEAR OF UNIFORMS
Military wear of uniforms during conventional combat operations in
international armed conflict reflects the general customary practice of nations,
subject to limited exceptions discussed in this section. This practice has a long
history, dating at least to the Peloponnesian Wars (431 to 404 BC).42
The customary principle of dislinclion is applicable to the regular military
forces. Conventional military forces should be distinguishable from the civilian
population in international armed conflict between uniformed military forces of
the belligerent states. It is an expectation, with codified exceptions, and another
exception acknowledged in the negotiating record of the 1977 Additional
Protocol 1.43 The criteria set forth for militia and partisan forces not a part of the
regular military had as their intention recognition of the generally accepted
practice of nations with respect to the characteristics of conventional forces.
44
enemy and the country are considered permissible." See also US Army Field Manual 27-
10, The Law of Land Warfare 51 (US Army 1956); War Office [UK], The Law of War on
Land at 101-02 (cited in note 35).
42 Where soldiers in international armed conflict lacked proper uniforms through no fault of
their own, they were expected to wear a distinctive emblem to distinguish themselves
from the civilian population. See Oppenheim, International Law at 429-30 (cited in note
37).
43 The negotiating record exception is discussed in Section IV.B. Two treaty exceptions
exist. GPW art 93 (cited in note 25) states in part:
[O]ffenses committed by prisoners of war with the sole intention of facilitating
escape and which do not entail any violence against life or limb, such as
offenses against public property, theft without intention of self-enrichment,
the drawing up or use of false papers, [and] the wearing ofcivilian clothing, shall
occasion disciplinary punishment only.
(Emphasis added.) In its discussion of this provision, the ICRC Commentagy states:
[A] prisoner of war retains that legal status until such time as he has made
good his escape. It is absolutely forbidden for him to commit any belligerent
act, to carry weapons, or to engage in armed resistance, otherwise he will be
liable to be treated as a sniper [sic] or saboteur.
Pictet, ed, Commentary on the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War at
454 (cited in note 29). The Commentary uses "sniper" in the pejorative sense in which it
was formerly used, that is, to denote a civilian who ambushes or "bushwhacks" enemy
military personnel. The term was used in this manner during the Franco-Prussian (1870-
1871) and Anglo-Boer (1899-1902) Wars; see Spaight, War Rights on Land at 52, 62-63
(cited in note 38), for discussion. A military sniper is a lawful combatant. See
Headquarters, Department of the Army, Office of The Judge Advocate General,
Memorandum, Subject: Legality of Snipers (Sept 29, 1992).
44 Maj. Richard R. Baxter, JA, USA, The Juridical Basis of the Distinction between Lawful
Combatant and Unbrivileged Belligerent 47-51 (unpublished thesis, The Judge Advocate
General's School, US Army, 1959) (on file with author).
Art 4A(2) constituted acknowledgement of the legitimacy of World War II partisan
warfare in its amendment of previous treaty categories to "members of other militias and
members of other volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements...." GPW
art 4A(2), 6 UST 3316 (cited in note 25) (emphasis added). This was a further relaxation
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No rule exists stating that a complete, standard uniform is the only way by
which regular armed forces may make themselves distinguishable from the
civilian population.45 Historically it has been the predominant way by which
military personnel, including Special Operations Forces, have distinguished
themselves from the civilian population. But it has not been the exclusive way.
A difficulty lies in the lack of definition. There is no international standard
as to what constitutes a "uniform., 46 Neither the 1907 Hague Convention IV or
the GPW offers a definition or precise standard. In the International Committee
of the Red Cross's (ICRC) Commentay on Article 4, GPW, its author states:
The drafters of the 1949 Convention, like those of the Hague Conventions,
considered it unnecessary to specify the sign which members of armed
forces should have for purposes of recognition. It is the duty of each State
to take steps so that members of its armed forces can be immediately
recognized as such and to see to it that they are easily distinguishable from
... civilians. 47
Similarly, reporting on discussions of the same issue at the 1974-1977
Diplomatic Conference that promulgated Additional Protocol I, the ICRC
Commentary states:
What constitutes a uniform, and how can emblems of nationality be
distinguished from each other? The Conference in no way intended to
define what constitutes a uniform.... "[A]ny customary uniform which
clearly distinguished the member wearing it from a non-member should
suffice." Thus a cap or an armlet etc. worn in a standard way is actually
equivalent to a uniform.
The uniform and other emblems of nationality are visible signs.
Although certain kinds of battle dress of different countries are very similar
nowadays, it is nevertheless possible to distinguish allied armed forces from
enemy armed forces by means of characteristics of outfitting and other signs
of nationality. Furthermore, this makes it possible to distinguish members
of the armed forces from the civilian population .... 48
of the principle of distinction. See Pictet, ed, Commentary on the Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War at 52-61 (cited in note 29).
45 US Department of War Manual, Rules of Land Waofare 22 (1914, corrected to April 15,
1917), states: "The distinctive sign.-This requirement will be satisfied by the wearing of a
uniform or even less than a complete uniform." See also Allan Rosas, The LegalStatus of
Prisoners of War A Study in International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflict 348-
49 (Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia 1976).
46 See Rosas, The Legal Status of Prisoners of War at 348 (cited in note 45) ("[T]he concept of
uniforms has never been explicitly defined in international law.").
47 Pictet, ed, Commentary on the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War at
52 (cited in note 29). Spaight, War Rights on Land at 57 (cited in note 38), emphasizes that
"[t]he 'distinctive emblem' does not mean a uniform."
48 Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski, and Bruno Zimmerman, eds, Commentary on the
Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 at 468 (ICRC
1987). The ICRC Commentagy does not reflect the complexity of the discussions within the
Working Group. As three Diplomatic Conference participants indicate in their separate
Vol. 4 No. 2
Special Forces' Wear of Non-Standard Uniforms
The ICRC Commentagy indicates that a state should ensure that its
conventional military forces be distinguishable from the civilian population. It
does not specify the manner in which this may be accomplished, or state that the
complete standard uniform is the only way in which this requirement may be
met.
In spite of the clear treaty language in Article 4A(2)(b), GPW ('fixed
distinctive sign") (emphasis added), the device need not be permanent or fixed.
What "fixed distinctive sign" means remains unresolved. In commentingon this,
Professor Howard S. Levie notes:
The ICRC has made several statements attempting to offer acceptable
interpretations of the meaning of the term "fixed distinctive sign"
[contained in Article 4A(2), GPW]. In 1960 it stated that the sign "must be
worn constantly"; but in 1971 it backtracked somewhat when it said that the
sign must be "fixed, in the sense that the resistant [partisan or guerrilla]
should wear it throughout all the operation in which he takes part."
Moreover, at that same time the ICRC stated that the sign "might be an
armband, a headdress, part of a uniform, etc." During World War II the
listed items were, on various occasions, used by resistance groups; but they
were frequently removed and disposed of at critical moments in order to
enable the individual to escape being identified as a member of the
resistance.49
Given generally acceptable "distinctive devices"-a hat, a scarf, or an
armband-any device recognizable in daylight with unenhanced vision at a
reasonable distance would meet the law of war obligation to be distinguishable
from the civilian population.
5 0
commentary, the Working Group experienced considerable difficulty with the practical
details of this issue; see Bothe, Partsch, and Solf, New Rules for Victims ofArmed Conflicts at
205-06 (cited in note 32).
49 Howard S. Levie, Prisoners of War in International Armed Conflict 47 (Naval War College
1978) (internal citations omitted). Spaight argued that the distinctive device "must be
fixed-externally, so as not to be assumed or concealed at will." War Rights on Land at 57
(cited in note 38). This is not consistent with prior or subsequent practice. The original
view regarding a distinctive device was expressed by Francis Lieber in his Guerrilla Paries
Considered with Reference to the Laws and Usages of War. In it he noted, "Nor would it be
difficult to adopt something of a badge, easily put on and off, and to call it a uniform."
Quoted in Richard Shelly Hartigan, Lieber's Code and the Law of War 40 (Precedent 1983)
(emphasis added).
50 Spaight commented:
At what distance should the sign be recognizable? The German authorities
demanded in 1870 that the French irregulars should be distinguishable at rifle
range. This, says an eminent English jurist, is "to ask not only for a complete
uniform but for a conspicuous one," [citing William Edward Hall, International
Law 523 (Clarendon 5th ed 1904)]. When rifles are sighted to 2,000 yards and
over, the German requirement is clearly unreasonable. If the sign is
recognizable at a distance at which the naked eye can distinguish the form and
color of a person's dress, all reasonable requirements appear to be met. At the
commencement of the Russo-Japanese War, the Russian Government
addressed a note to Tokio, stating that Russia had approved the formation of
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There are at least five categories of clothing: (a) a uniform such as BDU;
(b) uniform worn with some civilian clothing;"' (c) civilian clothing only, but
with a distinctive emblem to distinguish the wearer from the civilian population;
(d) civilian clothing only, with arms and other accoutrements (such as load-
bearing equipment or body armor) that, combined with actions and
circumstances, clearly manifest military status; and (e) civilian clothing, with
weapon concealed and no visual indication that the individual is a member of
the military.52 Based upon historical practice and treaty negotiation records, the
certain free corps composed of Russian subjects in the seat of war, and that
these corps would wear no uniform but only a distinctive sign on the cap or
sleeve. Japan replied:[ I
The Japanese Government cannot consider as belligerents the free corps
mentioned in the Russian Note, unless they can be distinguishable by the
naked eye from the ordinagypeople or fulfil the conditions required for militia
or volunteers by the Hague Riglement.
War Rights on Land at 57 (cited in note 38) (emphasis and punctuation in original, footnotes
omitted).
Similarly, US Department of War Manual, Rules of Land Wa fare (1914, corrected to
April 15, 1917) (cited in note 45), followed the Japanese Government's test:
The distinctive sign.-This requirement will be satisfied by the wearing of a
uniform, or even less than a complete uniform. The distance that the sign
must be visible is left vague and undetermined and the practice is not uniform.
This requirement will be satisfied certainly if the sign is "easily distinguishable by
the naked ye of ordinay people" at a distance at which the form of the individual
can be determined.
(Emphasis added). Hyde cites this provision as authority in 2 IntemationalLaw at 291 n 3
(cited in note 21).
The term "unenhanced vision" is utilized in Article 1 of Protocol II (Blinding
Laser Weapons) to the 1980 United Nations Conventional Weapons Convention. It
means normal vision without enhancements, such as binoculars, or vision corrected to
20/20. For its negotiating history, see Headquarters, Department of the Army, Office of
The Judge Advocate General, DAJA-IO Memorandum of Law, Subject: Travaux
Preparatoires and Legal Analysis of Blinding Laser Weapons Protocol (Dec 20, 1996). On
page 8, the memorandum notes the intent of its drafters:
Unenhanced vision means "the naked eye or ... the eye with corrective
eyesight devices," such as glasses or contact lens. It does not mean binoculars,
a telescopic sight, night-vision goggles or similar devices used to increase
visual capability above that required by an ordinary person to perform routine
tasks, such as reading or driving an automobile.
51 As noted in the text accompanying footnotes 151 and 190, British Special Forces in
North Africa in World War II and British and US Special Forces operating behind enemy
lines in Iraq during the 1990-1991 war to liberate Kuwait frequently wore indigenous
overcoats over their BDUs to counter one of the coldest winters on record, but also as a
ruse to reduce immediate, positive identification at a distance by Iraqi military units.
52 Treaty negotiation records suggest participants did not rely upon "carrying arms openly"
for regular forces. This is one of the four prerequisites for militias or partisans seeking
combatant and prisoner of war status. The phrase "carrying arms only" has itself been
plagued with lack of agreement as to its meaning. See, for example, W. Hays Parks, Air
War and the Law of War, 32 Air Force L Rev 1, 84 (1990) (the debate with regard to Article
44(3), Additional Protocol I). It also was of limited to no value in Afghanistan, as most
Afghan civilians carry military weapons. Similarly, following cessation of formal combat
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first three constitute a "uniform." The fourth should protect the individual from
charges of spying if captured if the individual is distinguishable from the civilian
population by physical separation, clearly military duties, and other
characteristics.53 The last is lawful for intelligence gathering or other clandestine
activities. As will be indicated, violation of the law of war occurs only when
there is treacherous use of civilian clothing that is the proximate cause of death
or injury of others. The 1974-1977 Diplomatic Conference did not regard it as
serious enough to be classified as a Grave Breach.
The United States is not a State Party to the 1977 Protocol I Additional to
the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949. Following extensive military, legal
and policy review, the United States decided against submission of Additional
Protocol I to the United States Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. 4
However, the United States acknowledged that it is bound by Additional
Protocol provisions that constitute a codification of customary international
law."5
operations in Iraq on May 1, 2003, private Iraqi citizens were permitted to retain
Kalashnikov AK-47 or AK-74 select fire weapons in their homes for personal protection.
Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 3 (May 23, 2003) (on file with author).
53 As summarized in this article, there is substantial state practice of Special Forces wear of
civilian clothing or non-standard uniforms. As an example of the fourth category, the
personal security detail for Commander in Chief, US Central Command ("Combatant
Commander"), during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM (1990-
1991) wore civilian attire on the basis that VIP protection from terrorist attack is not a
traditional military mission. (Attack by conventional Iraqi forces was not regarded as a
viable threat.) The personal security detail worked in close proximity to the Combatant
Commander, who wore standard BDU. The personal security detail in turn was
surrounded by an outer perimeter of uniformed Saudi soldiers. The civilian attire of the
personal security detail was dictated in large measure by host nation concerns. Their
immediate proximity to the commander and uniformed Saudi military, and their physical
separation from the civilian population was consistent with the principle of distinction. No
reasonable case could be made that their actions were tantamount to pe5f6dy (personal
knowledge of author and photograph in author's files).
54 On January 29, 1987, President Ronald Reagan informed the United States Senate that
Additional Protocol I would not be submitted for Senate advice and consent to
ratification. Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the Protocol II
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Noninternational Armed Conflicts, Concluded at Geneva on
June 10, 1977, 100th Cong, 1st Sess (1987), 26 ILM 561 (1987).
55 Department of State, 3 Cumulative Digest of United States Practice in International Law, 1981-
1988 at 3434-35 (cited in note 11). See also DoD Law of War Working Group, Session
One: Memorandum for Assistant Counsel (International), OSD, Subject: 1977 Protocols
Additional to the Geneva Conventions; Customary International Law Application (May
9, 1986). See also Michael J. Matheson, The United States Position on the Relation of Customay
International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 Am U J Intl
L & Poly 419 (1987), based upon a speech Mr. Matheson made at an American
University workshop. Mr. Matheson's statements with regard to the provisions of
Additional Protocol I regarded by the United States as customary law are based upon the
DoD Law of War Working Group memorandum, cited above. Thereafter he expresses
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Most paragraphs of Article 44, Additional Protocol I, amended the
customary law of war with respect to entitlement to prisoner of war status for
private groups (so-called "liberation movements"). For policy, humanitarian, and
military reasons, these provisions are regarded as unacceptable by the United
States, and were a major reason for the US decision against ratification.
With respect to conventional forces, Article 44, paragraph 7, states:
This Article is not intended to change the generally accepted practice of States
with respect to wearing of the uniform by combatants assigned to regular,
uniformed armed units of a Party to the conflict.5 6
An authoritative commentary on Additional Protocol I-prepared by
individuals directly involved in its drafting and negotiation-offers explanation
of this provision:
Within the Working Group the initial enthusiasm for a single standard
applicable both to regular and independent armed forces was dampened
when concern was expressed that the ... [new rules] might encourage
uniformed regular forces to dress in civilian clothing .... Accordingly, para.
7 was developed to overcome this concern. The report of the Working
Group, however, states that 'regulars who are assigned to tasks where they
must wear civilian clothes, as may be the case ... with advisers assigned to
certain resistance units, are not required to wear the uniform.['] The
implication of para. 7, construed in the light of the Working Group report is
that uniforms continue to be the principal means by which members of
regular uniformed units distinguish themselves from the civilian
population. . ., but that members of regular armed forces assigned or
attached to duty with the forces of resistance or liberation movements may
conform to the manner in which irregulars conform to the requirements of
para. 3. 57
his personal opinion that "certain provisions of Protocol I reflect customary international
law or are positive new developments which should ... become part of that law." Id at
421.
56 16 ILM at 1411 (cited in note 32) (emphasis added).
57 Bothe, Partsch, and Solf, New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts at 257 (cited in note 32).
The new rules set forth in Article 44, 3, were among those found unacceptable to the
United States in taking its decision against ratification. Paragraph 3 provides:
In order to promote the protection of the civilian population from the effects
of hostilities, combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from the
civilian population while they are engaged in an attack or in a military
operation preparatory to an attack. Recognizing, however, that there are
situations in armed conflicts where, owing to the nature of the hostilities an
armed combatant cannot so distinguish himself, in such situations, he carries
his arms openly:
(a) during each military engagement, and
(b) during such time as he is visible to the adversary while he is engaged in a
military deployment preceding the launching of an attack in which he is
to participate.
Acts which comply with the requirements of this paragraph shall not be
considered as perfidious ....
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That being said, another Diplomatic Conference participant offered the
following comment as to uniform requirement in light of Article 44, paragraph
7:
[It should be noted that it is apparently not intended to exclude all regular
forces from the application of the previous paragraphs of the article. What it
does imply, however, is that regular forces whenever possible (notably in
"conventional" types of hostilities), should continue to wear uniforms. 5 8
Thus, commentaries by participants in the 1974-1977 Diplomatic
Conference confirm Additional Protocol I's acknowledgement that, where
warranted by military necessity, it may be permissible in international armed
conflict59 for regular military forces to wear civilian clothing. At issue is whether
the action is a legitimate ruse or perfidy.
1. Ruses and Perfidy
Ruses of war are lawful deceptive measures employed in military
operations in international armed conflict for the purpose of misleading the
enemy.60 The law of war prohibits "killing or wounding treacherously individuals
belonging to the hostile nation or army," 6 commonly known aspejidy.62
58 Rosas, The Legal Status of Prisoners of War at 333 (cited in note 45). Continuing, the author
notes:
[]his provision does not seem to imply that all members of regular forces
have to wear uniforms in all situations in order to benefit from prisoner-of-
war status. On the other hand it serves as a reminder that the uniform
continues to be the normal way for regular combatants to distinguish themselves
from the civilian population.
(Emphasis added). The footnote in support thereof states:
In the 1976 report of Committee III [of the Diplomatic Conference] it is
stated that "regulars who are assigned to tasks where they must wear civilian
clothes, as may be the case, for example, with advisers assigned to certain
resistance units, are not required to wear the uniform when on such
assignments."
Id at 349 n 592 (citing CDDH/236/Rev 1, 29). See also Howard S. Levie, 2 Protection of War
Victims: Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions 475 (Oceana 1980).
59 The uniform requirement has not been codified for military operations short of
international armed conflict.
60 Hague Convention IV, Annex art 24 (cited in note 29). See also Spaight, War Rights on
Land at 152-56 (cited in note 38); Oppenheim, 2 International Law at 428 (cited in note
37); War Office [UK], The Law of War on Land at 101 (cited in note 35).
61 Hague Convention IV, Annex art 23(b) (cited in note 29).
62 The distinction between a ruse and perfidy is offered as "whenever a belligerent has
expressly or tacitly engaged, and is therefore bound by a moral obligation, to speak the
truth to an enemy, it is perfidy to betray his confidence, because it constitutes a breach of
good faith." Oppenheim, 2 International Law at 430 (cited in note 37). See also US Army
Field Manual 27-10 at 22, 49-55 (cited in note 41).
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Article 23 of the Annex to the 1899 Hague II states:
23. Besides the prohibitions provided by special Conventions, it is especially
prohibited-
(a) To kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile
nation or army.63
This article, along with Articles 29 and 31, were re-codified with non-
substantive changes in the Annex to the 1907 Hague IV. They are important for
several reasons. They constitute recognition of the general obligation for military
forces to fight in uniform. However, it is not a war crime for military personnel
to wear or fight in civilian clothing unless it is done for the purpose of and with
the result of killing treacherously. What constituted "killing treacherously" was
defined as perfidy in Article 37 of Additional Protocol I:
It is prohibited to kill, injure or capture an adversary by resort to perfidy.
Acts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is
entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of
international law applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that
confidence, shall constitute perfidy. The following acts are examples of
perfidy:
(a) the feigning of an intent to negotiate under a flag of truce or of a
surrender;
(b) the feigning of an incapacitation by wounds or sickness;
(c) the feigning of civilian, non-combatant status; and
(d) the feigning of protected status by the use of signs, emblems or
uniforms of the United Nations or of neutral or other States not
Parties to the conflict. 64
In order to be perfidy, the act must be the proximate cause of the killing,
injury, or capture of the enemy.65 But while the Diplomatic Conference codified
perfidy, it limited criminal liability. Perfidy was made a Grave Breach only if it
involves "the perfidious use ... of the distinctive emblem of the Red Cross, Red
Crescent or Red Lion and Sun."66 Wearing civilian attire or feigning civilian
status was not designated a Grave Breach.
Each differs from US and Coalition Special Forces operating in non-
standard uniforms as part of heavily armed units clearly known and identifiable
by the Taliban and al Qaeda in the war in Afghanistan. Special Forces' wear of
non-standard uniforms, whether partial BDU or the indigenous apparel of their
63 32 Stat 1803 (1899); see also Schindler and Toman, The Laws of Armed Conflicts at 82-83
(cited in note 16).
64 Id at art 37.
65 See Bothe, Partsch, and Solf, New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts at 204 (cited in note
32). As neither Afghanistan nor the United States is a State Party to Additional Protocol
I, the United States is bound by this article only to the extent that it codifies customary
law.
66 Additional Protocol I art 85, 3(f), 16 ILM at 1428 (cited in note 32).
Vol. 4 No. 2
Special Forces' Wear of Non-Standard Uniforms
Northern Alliance partners, including their distinctive pakol hats and/or tribal
scarves, did not constitute perfidy. US Army Civil Affairs wearing of Western-
style civilian clothing or indigenous attire in Afghanistan would not have
constituted perfidy unless it had been done for the purpose of and with the
result of killing treacherously. The NGOs' complaint made no such allegation,
and no evidence has surfaced to suggest such conduct.
That being said, the devil always has been in the details in drawing the line
between perfidy and the allowance for military personnel to operate in denied
areas in civilian attire. At the heart of the balance is the law of war principle of
distinction. State practice, of which more will be said, suggests that the lines
between the two are far from clear.
There is logic to this history. State tolerance of Special Forces' fighting in
civilian clothing is limited to special circumstances, such as support for partisans,
which is consistent with. humanitarian tolerance for captured guerrillas. It
follows efforts by many, including the International Committee of the Red
Cross, to provide prisoner of war protection to all and not to prosecute except
in the most egregious circumstances, such as terrorism and treacherous use of
civilian clothing.6v The drafters of Article 44 had a better sense of state practice
than did critics of US and Coalition Special Forces wear of non-standard
uniforms.
67 This approach, taken by the United States in Vietnam, was praised by the International
Committee of the Red Cross; see Prugh, Law at War at 66-67 (cited in note 15).
This legal approach is not new. During the American Civil War (1861-1865) and
the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902), rebel soldiers captured wearing either enemy uniforms
or civilian clothing were treated as prisoners of war and not prosecuted unless their
actions involved treachery. See, for example, Spaight, War Rghts on Land at 105-09 (cited
in note 38). Boer commandos' wearing of portions of British uniforms produced one of
the more sensational historic examples. In 1902 three Australian officers serving with the
Bushveldt Carbineers were tried by British court-martial for murder of captured Boers
and murder of a civilian. Their plea with regard to the murder of the captured Boers was
one of superior orders on the basis that Lord Kitchener had ordered the execution of
Boers wearing "British khaki." The prosecution argued that Boer punishment was
authorized only if the captured Boers had worn British khaki with intent to deceive.
Convicted, two of the three-Captain Harry "Breaker" Morant and Lieutenant Peter
Handcock-were executed by British firing squad, resulting in a controversy between
Great Britain and Australia that remains to this day. See, for example, Nick Bleszynski,
Shoot Straight, You Bastards!, (Random House (Australia) 2002) (on file with author) (this
tide is based upon Morant's last words). The incident was the basis for the 1979
Australian movie Breaker Morant, starring Edward Woodward and Bryan Brown. Its
screenplay was based upon the novel by Kit Denton, The Breaker (Angus & Robertson
1973). Subsequently, Denton authored the non-fiction Closed File: The True Stogy behind the
Execution of Breaker Morant and Peter Handcock (Rigby 1983) (on file with author), less
sympathetic to Morant than The Breaker. Comprehensive, authoritative accounts are
contained in Arthur Davey, ed, Breaker Morant and the Bushveldt Carbineers (Van Riebeeck
Society 1987) and William Woolmore, The Bushveldt Carbineers and the Pietersburg L'ght Horse
(Slouch Hat Publications 2000) (on file with author).
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Into the midst of this discussion steps the global war on terrorism.
Terrorists are not entitled to law of war protection, and the law of war is not
applicable as such in counter-terrorist operations.68 Counter-terrorist units have
been authorized to use hollow-point or other expanding ammunition,69 for
example, and have worn civilian clothing or non-standard uniforms on
missions.70 President Bush's radio address to the nation and the world on
September 29, 2001,71 in response to the September 11th terror attacks on the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon, may have prompted some in the military
to err initially and assume that law of war rules relating to uniform wear were not
applicable in the military operations that followed in Afghanistan.
This leads to the proper point for review of State practice.
B. WHAT IS STATE PRACTICE?
State practice is important to answering legal questions because it forms a
basis for determining customary international law. 2 State practice-a synonym
68 See Toman, The Status ofAlQaeda/Taliban Detainees at 287 (cited in note 30).
69 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Office of The Judge Advocate General, DAJA-
IA Memorandum 1985/7026, Subject: Use of Expanding Ammunition by US Military
Forces in Counterterrorist Incidents (Sept 23, 1985) (on file with author). Hollow-point
or expanding small arms ammunition is prohibited in international armed conflict by the
Hague Declaration Concerning Expanding Bullets of 29 July 1899. See Schindler and
Toman, The Laws of Armed Conflicts at 109 (cited in note 16). The United States is not a
State Party to this treaty, but has taken the position that it will adhere to its terms in its
military operations in international armed conflict to the extent that its application is
consistent with the object and purpose of Article 23(e) of the Annex to the Hague
Convention IV (cited in note 29), which prohibits employment of "arms, projectiles, or
material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering." See, for example, Headquarters,
Department of the Army, Office of The Judge Advocate General, DAJA-IO
Memorandum, Subject: 5.56mm, 77-grain Sierra MatchKingTM Bullet; Legal Review (May
19, 2000) (on file with author).
70 For example, German counterterrorist CrenZschutzgnrppe 9 ("GSG-9") and British Special
Air Service soldiers wore civilian clothing in the October 18, 1977 hostage rescue of
Lufthansa flight 181 in Mogadishu, Somalia. Barry Davies, Fire Magic (photo section)
(Bloomsbury 1994); Rolf Tophoven, GSG9: The German Response to Terrorism 66-73
(Bernard & Graefe Verlag 1985). The SAS wore non-standard fireproof uniforms during
its hostage rescue operation in the Iranian Embassy at Princes Gate in London on May 6,
1980. Michael Paul Kennedy, Soldier 'SAS (photo section) (Bloomsbury 1989); General
Sir Peter de la Billiere, Looking for Trouble 319-3 (photo section) (Harper Collins 1994).
Other examples are provided in the State Practice sections of this paper (Section IV.B
and Appendix).
71 Available online at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001 /09/
20010929.html> (visited Oct 9, 2003).
72 As the United States Supreme Court stated in The Paquete Habana, 175 US 677, 700
(1900):
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered
by the courts of justice ... [W]here there is no treaty, and no controlling ...
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for military history-reveals how governments interpret, apply, and/or enforce
law of war treaty provisions.
As illustrated in the Appendix, state practice in international armed conflict
and other military operations contains a significant record of Special Forces wear
of civilian attire, non-standard uniforms, and/or enemy uniforms as a ruse or for
other reasons. Beginning with Colonel T.E. Lawrence, the celebrated Lawrence
of Arabia, state practice reflects an overt tolerance bordering on admiration for
special forces wearing civilian clothing when working with indigenous persons in
enemy-denied areas, whether for intelligence gathering or combat operations.
7 3
Special Forces personnel captured while wearing civilian clothing have been
treated as spies rather than charged with a war crime, while Special Forces who
fought in civilian clothing and returned safely have been honored as heroes.
judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized
nations.
73 In an experience similar to that of US Special Forces in Afghanistan eighty-five years
later, Lawrence donned indigenous attire at the request of the Arab forces he joined, in
part because the only soldiers many Arabs had seen wearing khaki were Turkish, the
enemy. Mindful of the death of Captain William Shakespear the previous year because he
wore his British uniform, Lawrence obliged his hosts. Wilson, Lawrence of Arabia at 334-
35 (cited in note 7). In August 1917 Lawrence penned his Twenty-Seven Aricles, lessons
learned from his service in the Arab Revolt. They include:
18. Disguise is not advisable. Except in special areas let it be clearly known
that you are a British officer and a Christian. At the same time if you can
wear Arab kit when with the tribes you will acquire their trust and
intimacy to a degree impossible in uniform. It is however dangerous and
difficult. They make no special allowances for you when you dress like
them. Breaches of etiquette not charged against a foreigner are not
condoned to you in Arab clothes. You will be like an actor in a foreign
theatre, playing a part day and night for months, without rest, and for an
anxious stake. Complete success, which is when the Arabs forget your
strangeness and speak naturally before you, counting you one of
themselves, is perhaps only attainable in character: while half success (all
that most of us strive for-the other costs too much) is easier to win in
British things, and you yourself will last longer, physically and mentally,
in the comfort that they mean. Also then the Turks will not hang you
when you're caught.
19. If you wear Arab things, wear the best. Clothes are significant among
the tribes, and you must wear the appropriate, and appear at ease in
them. Dress like a Sherif-if they agree to it.
20. If you wear Arab things at all, go all the way. Leave your English friends
and customs on the coast, and fall back on Arab habits entirely.
Id at 963. As Lawrence indicates in Rule 18, he was fully aware of the risks involved in
wearing something other than his uniform. He was captured by Turkish forces in Deraa
on November 20, 1917, while on a reconnaissance mission in Arab attire. He was well
known and sought after by Turkish forces. Identified, he was subjected to severe sexual
abuse by his captors before managing to escape. Id at 459-61, 1083 n49.
As noted by James Maloney Spaight, Colonel Lawrence was not alone in wearing
civilian clothing on combat missions during World War I. See Spaight, Air Power and War
Rights at 273-74 (cited in note 31).
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The actions of Colonel Lawrence in all likelihood were not the first in
which indigenous attire was worn, but one of the more influential. An
appreciation of the list that follows necessitates a brief historical overview.
Germany's annexation of Austria in 1938 sparked interest within the
British military in the potential necessity for irregular operations. Recalling the
Spanish guerrillas in Wellington's campaign against the French in the Peninsular
War (1807-1809), 74 Boer commando success against the British in the 1899-
1902 Anglo-Boer War,75 Colonel Lawrence's success, the British experience in
facing Sinn Fein in Ireland (1919-1921),76 Chinese guerrilla operations against
Japan in the Sino-Japanese War,77 and other guerrilla activities in other conflicts,
in 1938 the Research Branch of the British General Staff ("GS(R)") began
research that led to preparation of Field Service Regulations entitled The Art of
Guerrilla Warfare, The Partisan Leaders' Handbook, and How to Use High Explosives,
all subsequently noted in GS(R) Report No. 8 Invesligation of the Possibiliies of
Guerilla Aclivities.
78
74 David Gates, The Spanish Ulcer- A Histoy of the Peninsular War 35 (W.W. Norton 1986),
noting Wellington's comment that because of the guerrillas' activities, "The French
armies have no communications and one army has no knowledge of the position or of
the circumstances in which others are placed, whereas I have knowledge of all that passes
on all sides." The term guerrilla is generally regarded as originating from the Peninsular
War. See also David G. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon 593-660 (MacMillan 1966).
Chandler notes: "Although the regular Spanish armies were destroyed or scattered, there
were no signs that the will to resist of the Spanish people had been even substantially
weakened. Popular patriotism, religious fanaticism and an almost hysterical hatred for the
French remained as strong as ever [in January 1809], and over the next five years the
world was to see the development of a new type of ruthless war waged by guerrillas who
refused to come down into the open plains ... and ... defied all efforts to destroy them,
in the meantime causing a heavy toll of French casualties." Id at 659-60. See also Don W.
Alexander, Rod of Iron: French Counterinsugengy Poliy in Aragon during the Peninsular War
(Scholarly Resources 1985).
75 Deneys Reitz, Commando: A Boer Journal of the Boer War (Praeger 1970). For general
reading, see Byron Farwell, The Great Anglo-Boer War (Harper & Row 1976); Thomas
Pakenham, The Boer War (Random House 1979). The term commando originated in Boer
use.
76 M.R.D. Foot, The IRA and the Origins of SOE, in M.R.D. Foot, ed, War and Sociey:
Historical Essays in Honour and Memory of J.R. Western, 1928-1971 at 57 (Barnes & Noble
1973); M.R.D. Foot, Resistance: European Resistance to Nasm, 1940-1945, 7 (McGraw-Hill
1977).
77 See generally Frank Dorn, The Sino-Japanese War, 1937-41 (MacMillan 1974).
7B These two publications were distributed free in the hundreds of thousands throughout
Europe and Southeast Asia during World War II, either in English or in translated form
in Burmese, Chinese, Czech, Danish, Dutch, French, German, Greek, Italian, Malay,
Norwegian, Polish, Serbo-Croat, Slovak, Slovene, and Thai. See M.R.D. Foot, SOE: An
Outline History of the Special Operations Executive, 1940-46 at 14 (University Publishers of
America 1984).
The association of British thinking with Lawrence's success, the Anglo-Boer War,
the Irish War, and the Sino-Japanese War is acknowledged in Jorgen Hxstrup, Europe
AblaZe 38-39 (Odense 1978); Foot, SOE in France at 2-4 (cited at note 34); Foot, SOE:
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Commencement of the Second World War with the German invasion of
Poland on September 1, 1939, revealed Germany's first use of Special Forces in
civilian clothing, enemy uniforms, or non-standard attire as a ruse to seize
critical objectives.79 British focus on partisan warfare and Special Forces was
renewed with Germany's invasion of Western Europe, the fall of France, and
British Army evacuation from Dunkirk in May 1940. Standing alone, the British
leadership identified several means for action. In addition to traditional means
such as naval blockade and aerial bombing, it directed commando raids and "the
undermining of enemy morale and production possibilities through close co-
operation with exile governments and through them--or without them-with
Resistance Movements in the territories occupied by the enemy."8 The Charter
for the British Special Operations Executive ("SOE") received War Cabinet
approval on July 22, 1940.81 At this time Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill
offered his oft-quoted edict: "And now set Europe ablaze." 82 Working closely
with exile governments, the British Government began making contact with
potential resistance movements throughout Nazi-occupied Europe, ultimately
An Outline Histogy at 11-15 (cited above); David Stafford, Britain and European Resistance,
1940-1945 at 19, 21 (MacMillian 1980); Peter Wilkinson and Joan Bright Ashley, Gubbins
& SOE 34, 36 (Leo Cooper 1993); W.J.M. Mackenzie, The Secret History of SOE: The
Special Operations Executive, 1940-1945 at 10, 38-39 (St. Errin's 2000). The Mackenzie
volume, the official "in-house" history of the British Special Operations Executive, was
compiled in the late 1940s. It remained classified until 1998, and reached open
publication in redacted form in 2000.
79 James Lucas, Kommando: German Spedal Forces of World War Two (St Martin's 1985). Specific
examples are provided on the list in the Appendix.
80 Hxstrup, Europe AblaZe at 37 (cited in note 78). There is no evidence to suggest
establishment of the Special Operations Executive was a reprisal for earlier German
actions. A reprisal is an act that would be unlawful if not committed for the purpose of
reprisal, done for the purpose of compelling the other belligerent to observe the law of
war, with strict standards for its execution. W. Hays Parks, A Few Tools in the Prosecution of
War Crimes, 149 Milit L Rev 73, 84 (1995). See generally, Frits Kalshoven, Belligerent
Reprisals (A.W. Sijthoff 1971); Andrew D. Mitchell, Does One Illegaliy Merit Another? The
Law of Beligerent Reprisals in International Law, 170 Milit L Rev 155 (2001); Shane Darcy, The
Evolution of the Law of Belligerent Reprisals, 175 Milit L Rev 184 (2003). At the same time,
early German operations made it clear to the British leadership that Germany had "set a
fashion for subversive activities in countries they proposed to conquer which defied the
Queensbury rules of international conduct that staider powers had recently observed.
This ... debased the standards of how countries ought to behave to each other; however
reluctant, these powers had to join the new fashion or succumb." Foot, SOE in France at
1 (cited in note 34).
81 J.R.M. Butler, ed, 1 History of the Second World War Grand Strategy 260-61 (HMSO 1957).
The Charter, WP(40)271, can be found in Mackenzie, The Secret History of SOE at 753-55
(cited in note 78).
82 See Foot, SOE in France at 11 (cited in note 34); E.H. Cookridge, Set Europe Ablate 1
(Thomas Y. Crowell 1966). Churchill's early enthusiasm for irregular warfare is
acknowledged in Foot, SOE in France at 7 (cited in note 34).
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providing them personnel and material support, subsequently coordinating their
actions to link them directly to the British and Allied war effort.83
It is important to understand what SOE was, and what it was not. SOE
was an independent secret service.84 It was not a military service. But SOE relied
heavily upon assignment of military officers to it, coordination of operations
with the military chiefs of staff, and was dependent on the military services for
personnel, support, supply and transportation." Although intelligence was
sometimes a by-product of its activities, SOE was not an intelligence collection
agency.86 It was intended for its operatives to engage in clandestine, subversive
operations in civilian clothing. The dagger lay concealed beneath the cloak.8" In
Prime Minister Churchill's words, this was 'ungentlemanly warfare' in which
the 'Geneva Convention' rules do not apply and the price of failure was often a
83 See Hxstrup, Europe AblaZe at 37, 41 (cited in note 78). For detailed histories by country,
see Mackenzie, The Secret Histoy Of SOE at 133-687 (cited in note 78); Foot, SOE in France
(cited in note 34); lan Trenowden, Operations Most Secret: SOE: The Malayan Theatre (Crdcy
1994); Charles Cruickshank, SOE in the Far East (Oxford 1983); Charles Cruickshank,
SOE in Scandinavia (Oxford 1986); M.R.D. Foot, SOE in the Low Countries (St. Ermin's
2001); Knud J.V. Jesperson, No SmallAchievement: Special Operations Executive and the Danish
Resistance, 1940-1945 (University of Southern Denmark 2002); Olav Riste and Beit
N6kleby, Nonay 1940-1945. The Resistance Movement (Johan Grundt Tanum Forlag 1973);
Tore Gjelsvik, Norwegian Resistance, 1940-1945 (C. Hurst 1979) (Thomas Kinsgston Derry,
trans).
84 See Foot, SOE: An Outline Histogy at 21 (cited in note 78).
85 See Mackenzie, The Secret Histoy Of SOE at 348-67 (cited in note 78); Foot, SOE in France
at 74-93 (cited in note 34). SOE was dependent upon the Royal Air Force and Royal
Navy for transport. See, for example, Gibb McCall, Flight Most Secret: Air Missions for SOE
and SIS (William Kimber 1981); Terence O'Brien, The Moonlight War. The Story of
Clandestine Operations in South-East Asia, 1944-45 (William Collins Sons 1987). US Army
Air Corps support is discussed in Ben Parnell, Carpetbaggers: America's Secret War in Europe
(Eakin 1987). Sea transport is described in part in Cruickshank, SOE in Scandinavia at 72-
92 (Sweden), 91-121 (Norway), and Appendix 1 (cited in note 83). The latter chapter and
Appendix 1 summarize "The Shetland Bus Service," which transported agents into
Norway-initially by fishing boat, then by submarine chasers furnished by the United
States Navy. See also id at 96; David Howarth, The Shetland Bus (Thomas Nelson & Sons
1951) (on file with author).
86 Responsibility for intelligence collection belonged to the Secret Intelligence Service (SlS).
See F.H. Hinsley, et al, 1 British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and
Operations 277-78 (HMSO 1979).
No attempt has been made to list or summarize the various British secret agencies
during World War II or their missions. The special operations mission of SOE was
performed by its S02 branch, while SO1 was responsible for covert propaganda. A
reader interested in the larger picture is invited to read any of the opening chapters of the
various books by M.R.D. Foot cited herein and/or British Intelligence in the Second World
War I at 3-43 and Hinsley et al, 2 British Intellgence in the Second World War 3-40 (HMSO
1981).
87 Foot, SOE in France at 11-12 (cited in note 34).
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slow and terrible death."88 Thus the British Government and SOE operatives
consciously entered into this form of operations fully cognizant of its law of war
implications.
The "Geneva Conventions" baby had not been tossed out with the bath
water. As was the case with US Special Forces in Afghanistan in 2002,
restrictions were placed on wearing civilian attire. Military personnel providing
transport to SOE personnel to and from an operation were required to be in
uniform, for example, while late-war operations enabled some to wear
uniforms.89  For post-D-Day operations, SOE personnel were provided
armbands for partisans and British military personnel not in uniform. 90 Prior to
and after D-Day, a clear showing of military necessity as it related to the mission
was necessary for authorization to wear civilian clothing. For example, on May
30, 1943, the British War Office informed the Commander-in-Chief, India, that
the Chief of Staff had decided:
No member of the armed forces ... should be sent on military operations,
however hazardous, in civilian clothes, except in the case of subversive
activities for which civilian clothes are essential.91
In addition to SOE, which was to work with underground movements in
Axis-controlled nations, the British also recognized the potential of commando
units to fight independently and conduct "tip-and-run" raids of not more than
forty-eight hours. Their formation began simultaneously with the establishment
of SOE.92 Generally performed in uniform or non-standard uniform, the list of
88 Dodds-Parker, Setting Europe Ablape at 36, 76, 198 (cited in note 20). The "Geneva
Conventions" were referred to as a general reference to the law of war. Churchill's
reference to the "Geneva Convention" otherwise would have been to the Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of July 27, 1929, 47 UST
2021-73. Article 1 thereof incorporated by reference Article 1 of the Annex to the Hague
Convention IV to establish criteria for prisoner of war status.
89 Dodds-Parker, Setting Europe Ablaze at 44, 145 (cited in note 20).
90 See Foot, SOE: An Outline Histogy at 98 (cited in note 78); Dodds-Parker, Setting Europe
AblaZe at 85, 124 (cited in note 20).
91 India Office Records L/WS/1/1296, cited in Cruickshank, SOE in the Far East at 249
(cited in note 83). Military necessity could change in a moment. For example, British
Liaison Officer Major Harvard Gunn was assigned to work with partisans in Southern
France in summer 1944. In his official report he noted: "Difficulty in movement, area
surrounded by German garrisons; made first recce area BARCELONNETTE-LARCHE,
had to travel as Gendarme, uniform hidden." Historian Arthur Layton Funk continues
the story while explaining Major Gunn's dilemma: "Gunn's uniform ... consisted of the
kilts of the Seaforth Highlanders, difficult to conceal under any circumstances, but,
wishing to let it be known that Allied support had arrived, Gunn and the other British
officers (as well as Jedburghs and OGs [Operational Groups]) wore their uniforms as
frequently as feasible." Arthur Layton Funk, Hidden AIy: The French Resistance, Special
Operations, and the Landings in Southern France, 1944 at 86 (Greenwood 1992).
92 See Butler, 2 Histoy of the Second World War Grand Strategy 259 (HMSO 1957); Ministry of
Defence, Combined Operations: The Official Stogy of the Commandos 3-4 (HMSO 1943); Hilary
St. George Saunders, The Green Beret: The Story of the Commandos, 1940-1945 at 21-25
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examples of state practice that follows nonetheless shows that commando units
did resort to civilian attire or enemy uniforms on occasion.
Germany invaded Russia on June 22, 1941. In response, Russian Premier
Josef Stalin declared that day:
The struggle against Germany must not be looked upon as an ordinary
war.... It is not merely a fight between two armies ... in order to engage
the enemy there must be bands of partisans and saboteurs working
underground everywhere.... In territories occupied by the enemy,
conditions must be made so impossible that he cannot hold out.93
Soviet partisan warfare differed from that of Great Britain and
(subsequently) the United States, if perhaps only slightly. Whereas Great Britain
and the United States exported support for underground movements in Axis-
occupied nations, the Soviet Union supported partisan warfare within its own
territory occupied by Germany, operating along interior lines. 94 The partisan
movement, organized, trained, and directed by Soviet Army personnel, was
(Michael Joseph 1949); Bernard Fergusson, The Watery Maze: The Stoy of Combined
Operations 47 (Holt 1961); Charles Messenger, The Commandos, 1940-1946 at 17-32
(William Kimber 1985). There were distinctions between SOE and Combined
Operations. While the former often operated in civilian attire, the latter normally carried
out its missions in uniform. Combined Operations raids normally were to be executed by
fifty or more British troops, to be withdrawn following the operation. SOE operations
were executed primarily by foreign personnel numbering no more than thirty, who would
"fade into the landscape" following their mission. See Mackenzie, The Secret Histoy of
SOE at 94 (cited in note 78). The original commando Independent Companies
subsequently were joined by other British special forces, such as the Long Range Desert
Group, Special Air Service, Special Boat Service, as well as clandestine reconnaissance
units such as the Combined Operations Pilotage Parties. See Roy Farran, Winged Dagger:
Adventures on Special Service (Collins 1948) (reprinted Cassel 1998); Virginia Cowles, The
Phantom Major. The Stoy of David Stirling and the S.A.S. Regiment (Collins 1958); Warner, The
Special Air Service (cited in note 5); Strawson, A Histoy of the S.A.S. Regiment (cited in note
5); Alan Hoe, David Stirling: The Authorised Biograpy of the Founder of the SASs 41-225
(Little, Brown 1992); Derrick Harrison, These Men Are Dangerous: The Early Years of the
S.A.S. (Blandford Press 1957); W.B. Kennedy Shaw, Long Range Desert Group: World War
II Action in North Africa (Collins 1945) (reprinted Greenhill 2000); Lt. Col. David Lloyd
Owen, The Desert My Dwelling Place (Cassell 1957); Michael Crichton-Stuart, C Patrol
(William Kimber 1958); John W. Gordon, The Other Desert War British Special Forces in
North Africa, 1940-1943 (Greenwood 1987); Brendan O'Carroll, Kiwi Scotpions: The Story of
the New Zealanders in the Long Range Desert Group (Token 2000); John Lodwick, The
Filibusters: The Stogy of the Special Boat Service (Methuen 1947); C.E. Lucas Phillips, Cockleshell
Heroes (Heinemann 1956); G.B. Courtney, SBS in World War Two: The Stogy of the Original
Special Boat Section of the Army Commandos (Robert Hale 1983); James D. Ladd, SBS: The
Invisible Raiders: The History of the Special Boat Squadron frous World War Two to the Present
(Arms and Armour 1983); Bill Strutton and Michael Pearson, The Secret Invaders (Hodder
and Stoughton 1958); Ian Trenowden, Stealthiy by Night: The COPPists Clandestine Beach
Reconnaissance and Operations in World War II (Cr6cy 1995).
93 See Stafford, Britain and European Resistance at 68 (cited in note 78).
94 Hastrup notes that the partisan organs worked closely with the General Staff of the
Soviet Armies and with the Central Staff of the Partisan Movement. Europe Ablaze at 36
(cited in note 78).
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substantial. In the month of July 1943, partisan forces carried out 10,000
separate demolitions of track to impede German re-supply efforts.9" During the
night of July 4, 1944 alone, partisans laid 4,110 separate demolition charges on
rail lines; 96 on June 19, partisans planted over 5,000 mines on the roads and
railroads behind the Second and Fourth German Armies.97 While it was
estimated that 250,000 people were directly engaged in partisan operations by
1944, Soviet authorities boasted that every Soviet civilian in Nazi-occupied
territory was at least indirectly involved in partisan activities, and on September
6, 1942, the partisan movement achieved the nominal status of a separate branch
of the Soviet military-something thought about in the United Kingdom by
some, but never achieved in either the United Kingdom or the United States.9"
Like underground operations supported by the United Kingdom and United
States, Soviet partisan operations-with civilians and military personnel fighting
in civilian attire-were state approved and directed.
The United States' movement into partisan operations closely followed
Russian and British actions. Early in World War II, the Roosevelt
Administration established the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). The
forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency, the OSS was a hybrid
organization, led by Major General William A. Donovan, a distinguished,
decorated former Army officer, under the administrative cognizance of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff but under operational control of the theater commander.99 It was
5 John Erickson, The Road to Berlin: Continuing the History of Stalin's War with Germany 114
(Westview 1983). For a detailed discussion of Soviet partisan warfare, see Earl F. Ziemke
and Magna E. Bauer, Moscow to Stalingrad- Decision in the East 199-219, 252-54, 330, 434-
35 (Military Heritage rev ed 1985) (on file with author); Earl F. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin
30, 103-05, 303-08 (Military Heritage 1968) (on file with author).
96 Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin at 141 (cited in note 95). For results in other German-occupied
nations, see Henri Michel, The Shadow War European Resistance, 1939-1945 at 214 (Harper
& Row 1972) (Richard Barry, trans).
97 Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin at 315 (cited in note 95).
98 Ziemke and Bauer, Moscow to Stalingrad at 330, 435 (cited in note 95); Ziemke, Stalingrad to
Berlin at 303 (cited in note 95). In June 1944, partisans in Belorussia numbered 150,000 in
150 brigades and 49 detachments. Id at 304.
99 Presidential Military Order, Office of Strategic Services, 3 CFR 1308 (1938-1942); JCS
67, Subject: Office of Strategic Services (June 21, 1942) (on file with author). The latter
stated in part that "Under direction of the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff ... [OSS will]
prepare plans for and ... execute subversive activities." See also R. Harris Smith, OSS:
The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Ageny (California 1972); Edward
Hymoff, The OSS in World War II (Richardson and Steirman 1972); Richard Dunlop,
Behind Japanese Lines: With the OSS in Burma (Rand McNally 1979); William Casey, The
Secret War against Hitler (Regnery Gateway 1988); Roger Hilsman, American Guerrilla: My
War behind Japanese Lines (Brassey's (US) 1990); Tom Moon, This Grim and Savage Game:
OSS and the Beginning of U.S. Covert Operations in World War II (Burning Gate 1991)
(reprinted Da Capo 2000); Franklin Lindsay, Beacons in the Night: With the OSS and Tito's
Partisans in Wartime Yugoslavia (Stanford 1993); Mills, Mills, and Brunner, OSS Special
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an organization focused on espionage, sabotage, and partisan support. US Army
personnel provided a major part of the OSS strength, which reached its
maximum of 13,000 in December 1944. US Army Special Forces traces its
lineage to OSS. °°
By the spring of 1944, SOE and OSS were operating together in a variety
of missions.1"' Some OSS units operated in uniform, while others did not under
all circumstances. In one of its major efforts in France, OSS operational units
worked in Nazi-occupied territory in direct support of the French Resistance. As
a leading history notes:
The first group consisted of seventy-seven Americans who wore civilian clothes
as organizers of secret networks, as radio operators, or as instructors in the
use of weapons and explosives. Thirty-three members of that group were
active in France before 6 June 1944, D-Day.
The largest OSS group in France consisted of some 356 Americans who
were members of Operational Groups (OGs). All recruits for the OGs were
French-speaking volunteers from US Army units, primarily infantry and
Operations in China (cited in note 7); Dan Pinck, Journey to Peking: A Secret Agent in Wartime
China (Naval Institute 2003).
100 Bank, From OSS to Green Berets (cited in note 5), traces the OSS to US Army Special
Forces lineage, as does Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare (cited in note 5), and
Sutherland, The OSS Operational Groups, 2 Special Warfare at 2-13 (cited in note 29). As
indicated in the main text, the OSS also was a forerunner of the Central Intelligence
Agency. See Thomas F. Troy, Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the
Central Intelligence Ageny (CIA 1981); Richard Dunlop, Donovan: America's Master Spy (Rand
McNally 1982).
101 SOE/Special Operations (SO) became Special Forces Headquarters on May 1, 1944.
British SOE and US OSS components in the United Kingdom were amalgamated into
the Special Projects Operation Center (SPOC) on May 23, 1944. See Foot, SOE in France
at 32 (cited in note 34). As described by one authority, SPOC executed six types of
missions:
1. British SOE missions ... ;
2. French missions ... ;
3. Inter-allied missions, made up of British, French, and American
representatives;
4. Jedburghs. [discussed in this Section and Appendix];
5. Operational Groups. The Operational Groups were an elite OSS
mission. They were paratroopers organized into squads of thirty who
generally fought in component parts, for example, a half: thirteen men
and two officers, all of them American volunteers for "extra hazardous
duty" and assigned to OSS for special missions.
6. Counterscorch. These counter-sabotage teams consisted of French naval
personnel sent to the ports of Marseille, Toulon, and Sate to keep the
Germans from sabotaging the docks or blocking the channels.
Funk, Hidden Ally at 33-34 (cited in note 91).
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engineer (for demolition experts).... Working in uniform, these teams
parachuted behind the lines after D-Day to perform a variety of missions.102
In addition to its Operational Groups, OSS worked with SOE in Jedburgh
teams. These teams were intended to be composed of an Englishman, an
American, and a continental European member, each military, two of whom
were officers; the third was the communications specialist.103 The initial core
contained fifty US officers fluent in French who were to parachute in uniform to
resistance groups, initially throughout France during the weeks following the
Allied landings on June 6, 1944. They would provide liaison with the
underground, arm and train the Maquis, boost "patriotic morale," and
coordinate resistance activity with Allied military strategy. Ninety-three Jedburgh
teams parachuted into France to join the Maquis after D-Day, numbering three
hundred French, British, and US officers. Eventually they served in other Nazi-
occupied territory.'
1 4
While the Jedburghs normally operated in uniform, this was not always
possible. In an operation in Nazi-occupied France, Major Horace Fuller, USMC,
avoided capture as a result of accepting the advice of his French contact to wear
civilian clothing, including during combat operations.'05
102 Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare at 28 (cited in note 5) (emphasis added). As was the
case in Great Britain, the United States formed its own commando units, such as the
Army Rangers, the short-lived Marine Raiders, the Army's 5307th Composite Unit
Provisional (Merrill's Marauders), and the Canadian/American First Special Service
Force, all uniformed units and therefore beyond the scope of this article. For their
history, see William 0. Darby and William H. Baumer, Darby's Rangers: We Led the Way
(Presidio 1980); Michael J. King, William Orlando Darby: A Military Biography (Archon
1981); Michael J. King, Rangers: Selected Combat Operations in World War II (Leavenworth
Papers No 11, US Army Command and General Staff College 1985) (on file with author);
Merrill's Marauders: February-May 1944 (Historical Division, War Department 1945)
(reprinted US Army Center for Military History 1990); Robert D. Burhans, The First
Special Service Force: A War History of the North Americans 1942-1944 (Infantry Journal
1947). First Special Service Force was a combined unit of Canadian and US Army forces.
For the history of Marine Corps special operations units, see Charles L. Updegraph, Jr.,
U.S. Marine Corps Special Units of World War II at 1-35 (History and Museums Division,
Headquarters, US Marine Corps 1972), and Joseph H. Alexander, Edson's Raiders: The 1st
Marine Raider Battalion in World War II (Naval Institute 2001).
103 This nationality mix became more the exception than the rule. Of the 101 Jedburgh
teams deployed to France, only 10 were so composed. Sutherland, The OSS Operational
Groups, 2 Special Warfare at 13 n1l (cited in note 29); Funk, Hidden Ally at 141,145 (cited
in note 91).
104 Smith, OSS: The Secret Histor of America's First Central IntelZgence Ageng at 174-75 (cited in
note 99); Bank, From OSS to Green Berets at 13-62 (cited in note 5); Cookridge, Set Europe
AblaZe at 241 (cited in note 82); Stafford, Britain and European Resistance at 155 (cited in
note 78); Foot, Resistance at 247 (cited in note 76); Foot, SOE: An Outline History at 151,
191 (cited in note 78); Foot, SOE in France at 33-34 (cited in note 34).
10s See Maj. Robert E. Mattingly, Heringbone Cloak-GI Dagger. Marines of the OSS 140 (US
Marine Corps 1989). Another Marine, Captain Peter J. Ortiz, followed the SOE practice
of parachuting in civilian clothes, but carried his Marine Corps uniform. In a touch of
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Similar operations occurred in other theaters. On May 4, 1942, a US Navy
officer formed Naval Group China. Composed of Navy and Marine Corps
personnel, its mission was to establish radio intelligence posts, weather-gathering
and lookout stations, form, supply, and train indigenous sabotage units, and
conduct attacks on Japanese units and equipment. Also known as the Sino-
America Cooperative Organization, it executed its operations successfully for
the duration of the war, many of them in non-standard uniform or indigenous
civilian attire, depending on the mission and situation." 6
This is not the time to recount Allied support for partisan operations in
World War II, nor what then were termed "commando" operations. However,
several observations are relevant to the issue at hand. First, partisan operations
were universal, occurring in every Axis-occupied nation, actively supported by
each of the major Allies-the United Kingdom, the United States, and Soviet
Union-and each government in exile. 07 Second, they were significant in their
breadth and longevity. For example, the French Resistance Movement began
shortly following German conquest in 1940 and continued through the war. By
1944, approximately three million men and women were associated with the
various French Resistance organizations. In Yugoslavia, 400,000 were involved
in partisan operations.109
Resistance activity was dependent upon volunteers-whether partisans
from the civilian population of Axis-controlled nations, civilian and military
bravado, he frequently wore it in populated areas, thereby alerting the Germans and
forcing his team to remain on the move. Foot, SOE in France at 357 (cited in note 34). On
one occasion Captain Ortiz entered a caf6 dressed in a long (civilian) cape. Hearing a
German soldier denigrate Americans, Ortiz drew his weapons-two .45 pistols-then
threw back his cape to reveal his Marine uniform before opening fire on the Germans.
Mattingly, Herringbone Cloak-Gl Dagger at 116 (cited above). For his OSS service, Captain
Ortiz was awarded two Navy Crosses, a Legion of Merit, made a member of the Order of
the British Empire, and received the French Croix de Guerre. Captain Peterj. Ortit 18
Fortitudine 14 (Marine Corps History and Museums Division Historical Bulletin Fall
1988) (on file with author); Lt. Col. Harry W. Edwards, USMC (ret.), A Different War:
Marines in Europe and North Africa 12-13 (History and Museums Division, US Marine
Corps 1994); Benis Frank, Colonel PeterJulien Ori*W US Marine (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author). The author is indebted to Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Wheeler,
USMC, for the last two documents.
106 Mills, Mills, and Brunner, OSS Special Operations in China at 9 (cited in note 7). Vice Adm.
Milton E. Miles, USN, A Difernt Kind of War 274, 371 (Doubleday 1967); Pinck, Journy to
Peking: A Secret Agent in Wartime China at 134 (cited in note 99); Dale Andrade, Every Man
a Tiger, Naval Hist 16 (Nov/Dec 1994).
107 Hxestrup, Europe AblaZe at 35, 49 (cited in note 78); Michel, The Shadow War at 355 (cited
in note 96).
108 Hxstrup, Europe AblaZe at 14 (cited in note 78).
109 Id at 50. SOE schools graduated 7,500 men and women for operations in Western
Europe, and 4,000 for missions in Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece, Albania, Poland,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and elsewhere. See Cookidge, Set Europe Ablaze at
26 (cited in note 82).
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personnel serving with the SOE or OSS, or members of Special Forces."' All
were aware of the possible consequences if they were caught, whether in
uniform or other attire. At the same time, execution as a spy if captured in
something other than standard uniform was not a certainty."'
110 Hxstrup, Europe AblaZe at 22 (cited in note 78). See also Cruickshank, SOE in the Far East
at 249 (cited in note 83), which in noting the Chief of Staff's May 30, 1943 communiqu6
to the Commander in Chief in India, continues: "The men must be volunteers and
warned that if caught they were likely to be shot without trial." Cruickshank adds: "Of
course SOE were equally powerless to order men to act as agents."
In his classic and humorous tale of his experience as an Army officer in OSS,
Roger Hall repeats the warning provided him at the beginning of his OSS training:
These units are to be parachuted deep behind enemy lines and carry out work
which is designed to accomplish three things. First, organize guerrilla forces
and lead them against the enemy. Second, disrupt enemy activity as much as
possible. Third, send back by whatever means possible all intelligence that can
be gathered. You will operate in uniform, but if you are captured, the chances
are fifty to one you will not be treated as a prisoner of war. The work is highly
confidential and dangerous. Knowing all this, do you still volunteer?
Roger Hall, You're Stepping on My Cloak and Dagger 20 (Norton 1957). See also Bank, From
OSS to Green Berets at 79-80 (cited in note 5) and Mills, Mills, and Brunner, OSS Special
Operations in China at 12 (cited in note 7).
11 For example, in 1942 two German spies, Johann Eppler and Heinrich Gerd Sandstette,
were transported across the Libyan desert and into Cairo to collect intelligence on the
British campaign in North Africa. Because they had German military paybooks on them
at the time of their apprehension, they were treated as prisoners of war. Saul Kelly, The
Lost Oasis: The Desert War and the Hunt for Zer!ura: The True Story behind The English Patient
226, 228 (Westview 2003). The Eppler-Sanstette mission became the basis for Ken
Follett's novel The Key to Rebecca (Signet 1981).
Captured SOE and OSS personnel faired unevenly, as noted in Foot, SOE in
France at 465-69 (cited in note 34); Foot, SOE in the Low Countries at 72, 193, 276-77
(cited in note 83); Mackenzie, The Secret Histogy of SOE at 636, 664 (cited in note 78);
Bank, From OSS to Green Berets at 66 (cited in note 5) (noting that one captured OSS
officer was executed, while another caught by German troops survived because he was
not turned over to the Gestapo). Even when captured in uniform, Special Forces
personnel often were murdered. For example, British Special Air Service (SAS) personnel
were forced to change into civilian clothing before being taken into the woods to be
executed. See Foot, SOE in France at 305, 405 (cited in note 34). The individual
responsible, Paris Sicherheitsdienst ("SD") Leader Josef Keiffer, was captured after the war,
tried, convicted, and hanged. See id at 305. Other British commandos captured in
uniform suffered the same fate. Mackenzie, The Secret History of SOE at 653 (cited in note
78). An SAS War Crimes Investigation Team assisted in the capture of Germans
suspected of murdering SOE or SAS personnel. See Anthony Kemp, The Secret Hunters
(Michael O'Mara 1986).
Others fared better. Captured in North Africa in 1943, OSS officer Jerry Sage was
sent to a prisoner of war camp after successfully concealing his OSS status and claiming
to be a downed aviator. Jerry Sage, Sage (Miles Standish 1985) (on file with author). An
SOE agent captured in Norway successfully employed the same cover story. See
Mackenzie, The Secret History of SOE at 659 (cited in note 78). Similarly, David Stirling, a
founder of the British Special Air Service, survived his capture. See Hoe, David Stirling at
223-57 (cited in note 92).
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Partisan sabotage operations were regarded as a valuable alternative to
highly inaccurate strategic bombing in Nazi-occupied territory, as the Allies
sought to reduce collateral civilian casualties to friendly populations.' 12 Partisan
sabotage was the "smart bomb" of World War II. In its employment of very
precise means, it was the epitome of the second facet of the fundamental law of
war principle of distinction.113 In some cases, the evidence was clear that
112 The French, Dutch, Belgian, and Norwegian governments-in-exile expressed concern
over collateral civilian damage and injuries resulting from Allied air attacks. See Michel,
The Shadow War at 212, 216-17 (cited in note 96). As its author notes, "The Allies
undoubtedly committed a major error in disregarding such appeals and in persisting to
bomb Europe-including their friends in the Resistance." Id at 217. Sabotage vis-a-vis air
attacks did reduce civilian casualties. An example is the successful SOE attack on the
SCNF (French national railways) locomotive works at Fives, described as one of the
largest and most important in France, on June 27, 1943. The factory was in a heavily
populated area, and bombing would have caused many collateral civilian casualties..
Dressed as gendarmerie with the raid leader disguised as Gestapo, the factory was
attacked successfully with no loss of life. Foot, SOE in France at 266 (cited in note 34).
Another example-the Peugeot factory at Sochaux near Montbdliard, which
manufactured tank turrets-was taken out of action by an SOE-delivered satchel charge
after an earlier Royal Air Force attack missed the target and resulted in heavy civilian
casualties nearby. Foot, SOE:An Outline History at 219-20 (cited in note 78). For a list of
key SOE industrial sabotage, see Foot, SOE in France at 505-17 (cited in note 34).
Benjamin F. Jones, The Moon is Down: The Jedburgbs and Support to the French Resistance
(unpublished MA thesis, University of Nebraska, 1999) describes the Resistance process
for infiltrating and attacking these targets. Foot, SOE in France at 505 (cited in note 34),
notes that the industrial sabotage listed was accomplished with a total of approximately
3,000 pounds of explosive. In contrast, a single Royal Air Force Lancaster bomber could
carry 14,000 pounds of bombs, with some modified to carry the 22,000 pound Grand
Slam bomb. Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, 1 The Strategic Air Offensive against
Germany, 1939-1945 at 452-53 (Sir James Butler, ed, History of the Second World War,
United Kingdom Military Series) (HMSO 1961) (on file with author). For heavy bomber
accuracy, see W. Hays Parks, '"reision" and 'Area" Bombing: Who Did Which, and When?, 18
J Strategic Stud 147 (1995). In contrast to SOE accuracy through industrial sabotage, it
took 9,070 bombs dropped by 3,024 US heavy bomber aircraft to achieve a 90 percent
probability of a single hit on a target 60 by 100 feet in size. Richard P. Hallion, Storm over
Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War 283, Table 2 (Smithsonian 1992).
113 Distinction is the customary international law obligation of parties to a conflict to engage
only in military operations the effects of which distinguish between the civilian
population (or individuals not taking a direct part in hostilities), and combatant forces or
military objectives, directing the application of force solely against the latter.
The principle of distinction was acknowledged in the 1863 US Army General
Orders No 100 (the Lieber Code). Articles 20 through 23 state:
20. Public war is a state of armed hostility between sovereign nations or
governments. It is a law and requisite of civilized existence that men live
in political, continuous societies, forming organized units, called states
or nations, whose constituents bear, enjoy, suffer, advance and
retrograde together, in peace and in war.
21. The citizen or native of a hostile country is thus an enemy, as one of the
constituents of the hostile state or nation, and as such is subjected to the
hardships of the war.
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partisan/Special Forces sabotage often was more effective than air operations
against the same targets," 4 while in other instances OSS-led partisans were able
22. Nevertheless, as civilization has advanced during the last centuries, so
has likewise steadily advanced, especially in war on land, the distinction
between the private individual belonging to a hostile country and the
hostile country itself, with its men in arms. The principle has been more
and more acknowledged that the unarmed citizen is to be spared in
person, property, and honor as much as the exigencies of war will admit.
23. Private citizens are no longer murdered, enslaved, or carried off to
distant parts, and the inoffensive individual is as little disturbed in his
private relations as the commander of the hostile troops can afford to
grant in the overruling demands of a vigorous war.
Schindler and Toman, The Laws ofArmed Conflicts at 6-7 (cited in note 16).
Similarly, two UN General Assembly Resolutions acknowledge the principle. UN
General Assembly Resolution No 2444 (XXIII 1968), adopted unanimously, states in
part:
- That it is prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian population as
such; [and]
- That distinction must be made at all times between persons taking part in
the hostilities and members of the civilian population to the effect that the
latter be spared as much as possible.
Schindler and Toman, The Laws of Armed Conflicts at 263 (cited in note 16).
UN General Assembly Resolution No 2675 (XXV 1970), adopted by a vote of
109-0, with 18 States abstaining or absent, states in part:
(2) In the conduct of military operations during armed conflicts, a
distinction must be made at all times between persons actively taking
part in the hostilities and civilian populations.
(3) In the conduct of military operations, every effort should be made to
spare the civilian populations from the ravages of war, and all necessary
precautions should be taken to avoid injury, loss or damage to civilian
populations.
(4) Civilian populations as such should not be the object of military
operations.
(5) Dwellings and other installations that are used only by civilian
populations should not be the object of military operations.
Schindler and Toman, The Laws ofArmed Conflicts at 267 (cited in note 16).
114 See Mackenzie, The Secret Histoy of SOE at 599 (cited in note 78), which provides the
following report from a French railway engineer who reached England in December
1943:
Aircraft attacks on Locomolives
Since the beginning of 1943 650 locomotives have been hit (an average of 70 a
month) out of 10,200 in service.
The damage is very slight and the average period of repair is a fortnight.
There are therefore on an average 35 locomotives under repair, about 0.34
percent of the total.
In order to achieve this derisory result 78 railwaymen have been killed and
378 wounded....
Sabotage of Locomotives
40 locomotives on an average were sabotaged each month, but the repairs
required were much more serious. The average time required has not yet been
established. But if we take it as six months, this means 240 locomotives under
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to destroy heavily defended targets that had resisted air attack."' While the
rationale for partisan or Special Forces attacks may have been selected over
aerial attack more for political than law of war reasons,"6 it offers evidence of
why governments chose not to condemn attacks in civilian clothing as a Grave
Breach in Additional Protocol I. Special Forces/partisan unconventional warfare
operations tied down Axis units that could have been used more effectively
engaging Allied forces but for the partisan threat,"7 and significantly impaired
German efforts to reinforce their defenses at Allied points of offensive ground
operations." 8 Special Forces and their partisan allies performed other life-saving
actions, such as the rescue of downed Allied aircrew and assistance in running
escape routes."' Special Forces served as on-the-scene ambassadors where
Allied combat operations killed innocent civilians. 20
repair, 2.40 percent of the total, eight times as many as those damaged by
aircraft.
See also Michel, The Shadow War at 215-16 (cited in note 96), describing the SOE attack
on the Vermork heavy water facility in Norway.
115 Mills, Mills, and Brunner, OSS Special Operations in China at 45, 47, 186-203 (cited in note
7) describes one such case. The Yellow River Bridge carrying Ping-Han railway traffic had
been attacked repeatedly but unsuccessfully by the 311th (US) Air Force, with heavy
friendly losses. OSS Operational Team Jackal severed the bridge on August 9, 1945.
116 As a matter of policy, Great Britain prohibited area bombing attacks in Nazi-occupied
territories. Webster and Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany at 463 (cited
in note 112); Robin Neillands, The Bomber War: The Allied Air Offensive against Nazi Germany
288-89 (Overlook 2001).
117 See, for example, Michel, The Shadow War at 289 (cited in note 96), which notes that in
Russia in the summer of 1942, it was necessary for Germany to employ fifteen divisions
in counter-partisan operations.
118 See Foot, SOE: An Outline History at 225-27 (cited in note 78); Stafford, Britain and
European Resistance at 153-54 (cited in note 78); Hxstrup, Europe Ablate at 434-35 (cited in
note 78). Hxstrup notes on page 435, for example, that:
On D-Day itself, about 950 actions were carried through, out of a planned
1050, and German Divisions which relied upon railway transport were delayed
in their movements towards the [Allied] bridgehead in Normandy for up to
two weeks, by which time the bridgehead had been consolidated.
119 See Hastrup, Europe Ablaze at 373-74 (cited in note 78); Airey Neave, The Escape Room
(Doubleday 1970); M.R.D. Foot and J.M. Langley, M19: The Briftish Secret Service That
Fostered Escape and Evasion 1939-1945 and Its American Counterpart (Bodley Head 1979).
120 For example, on August 13, 1944, a US Fifteenth Air Force heavy bomber attack on a
bridge across the Dr6me River in southern France missed the bridge and struck the town
of Crest, killing 280 civilians, wounding 200, and destroying 480 buildings. OSS
Operational Group ALICE arrived on the scene, and reported:
Upon arriving they were greeted by a very downhearted and somewhat
belligerent group of people. The damage consisted of destruction of about
one-fourth of the town .... Lt. Barnard and Lt. Meeks talked with the people,
visited the hospital and encouraged the people that the bombing was a mistake
and would not occur again.
Funk, Hidden Ally at 77-79, 153 (cited in note 91); Kit C. Carter and Robert Mueller, eds,
The Army Air Forces in World War II: Combat Chronology, 1941-1945 at 424 (Center for Air
Force History 1973).
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Partisan operations, including sabotage and direct attacks on Axis
personnel, were executed primarily in civilian attire, occasionally (after the Allied
return to Europe on June 6, 1944) wearing a distinctive device, sometimes in a
partial uniform, but seldom in full uniform. "Uniform" varied, often being more
like modern "gang" colors than a traditional military uniform.' The same was
true for SOE and OSS military personnel serving with resistance movements
and, in some cases, Special Forces.
Finally, partisan operations were successful. Danish historian Jorgen
Hxstrup concludes: "[]he Resistance Movements, seen in their entirety, deeply
influenced the course of the war, psychologically, militarily and politically.' 22 In
support thereof, he quotes Russian historian E. Boltin:
History has never known a popular fight of such huge dimensions as was
apparent during the 1939-1945 war. Furthermore the masses had never
before taken so directly part in the military combat, as was the case in the
last war in Europe.123
V. CONCLUSION
The preceding comments are offered to show that the wearing of civilian
attire by partisans or military personnel in Special Forces units or in the SOE or
OSS was neither unique, occasional, nor limited in time and space. In the
examples listed in the Appendix, it is clear that the wearing of civilian attire or
non-standard uniform (and, in some cases, enemy uniform) was a deliberate act
based upon a decision made at the highest levels of government. State practice
provides several points for fine-tuning a general principle:
First, treacherous killing involves more than wearing or fighting in civilian
clothing. Colonel Lawrence wore indigenous attire while leading the Arab
uprising against the Ottoman Empire in the Hejaz Province of Arabia (Syria) in
1916. Fighting in large, armed groups against the Turkish Army, his actions
parallel those of Coalition Special Forces aligned with Northern Alliance and
Southern Alliance forces in Afghanistan, suggesting a nuance to the law of war
principle of distinction: an armed military group recognizable at a distance and
readily identifiable to the enemy by its size and other characteristics, even when
wearing indigenous attire with or without distinctive devices, is acting lawfully.
Second, non-standard uniforms or indigenous attire may be adopted for
practical rather than perfidious reasons. The British/Commonwealth Long
Range Desert Group ("LRDG"), operating behind enemy lines in North Africa
121 See, for example, Roy Farran, Operadion Tombola 22, 32, 33, 35, 59 (Arms and Armour
1960).
122 Hxstrup, Europe AblaZe at 9, 421-31 (cited in note 78).
123 Id at 7. On pp 42-43, the same author attributes emphasis on partisan warfare to several
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from 1940-1943, adopted the kafflyeh and agal as a standard part of their uniform
for utilitarian purposes, for example. 24 The LRDG wore native sheep or
goatskin coats to ward off the nighttime desert cold, as did British and US
Special Forces operating behind Iraqi lines in the 1991 Coalition effort to
liberate Kuwait.25 Wear of the latter by the LRDG served partially as a ruse
against casual observation, such as by enemy aircraft. However, their identity
clearly was recognizable at a distance by enemy ground forces."2 6
Third, law of war compliance with something as simple as wearing a
distinctive device may not be practical where the enemy is known to punish
rather than reward compliance. For example, immediately prior to D-Day Oune
6, 1944), British air-delivered supplies included armbands for partisan and
supporting Special Forces' use once Allied conventional forces returned to the
continent. 127 However, distinctive emblem wear was viewed with skepticism in
124 Gordon, The Other Desert War at 50 (cited in note 92).
125 Ratcliffe, Botham, and Hitchen, Eye of the Storm at 214, 305, 326 (cited in note 20).
126 See Shaw, Long Range Desert Group at 27 (cited in note 92); O'Carroll, Kiwi Scorpions at 14-
15, 75-79 (cited in note 92).
127 See Foot, SOE: An Outline Histoy at 98 (cited in note 78); Dodds-Parker, Setting Europe
AblaZe at 85, 124 (cited in note 20). This pessimism was confirmed in a number of cases.
Four uniformed British soldiers captured during a failed attack on the German heavy
water plant at Vermork, Norway, were executed in compliance with this order on
November 20, 1942. See Richard Wiggan, Operation Freshman: The Rjoekan Heay Water
Raid, 1942 at 81-82 (William Kimber 1986). During the night of March 22, 1944, a
uniformed US Army special operations team landed along the Italian coast about sixty
miles north of La Spezia. Captured two days later, they were executed on the orders of
General Anton Dostler who, in turn, was following Hitler's Fiihrerbefehl (Commando
Order) of October 18, 1942, which ordered all SOF to be executed, even if captured in
uniform. Dostler was tried and convicted by a US Military Commission on October 8-12,
1945, sentenced to death, and executed. In re Dostler, in 1 Law Reports of Trials of War
Criminals 22 (cited in note 29).
The background to Hitler's Fiihrerbefehlis contained in Foot, SOE in France at 186-
87 (cited in note 34). The Fiihrerbefehl declared:
[A]l] enemies on so-called commando missions in Europe or Africa challenged
by German troops, even if they are to all appearances soldiers in uniforms or
demolition troops, whether armed or unarmed, in battle or in flight, are to be
slaughtered to the last man .... Even if these individuals when found should
apparently be prepared to give themselves up, no pardon is to be granted
them.
At a minimum the Commando Order violated Article 23(d) of the Annex to the Hague
Convention IV (prohibiting denial of quarter) (cited in note 29). The Commando Order
is contained in its entirety in United States v Wilhelm von Leeb ("High Command Case"), 11
Trials of War Criminals 73-75, 525-27 (GPO 1951), with additional implementing orders
at pp 76-110. The Court's judgment that the Fiihrerbefehl was "criminal on its face" is on
527. The Fiihrerbefehl also is discussed in 11 International Militagy Tribunal 26 (GPO 1946),
and 15 International Militay Tribunal 296-306, 403-10, the trial of major German war
criminals.
In Operation COLD COMFORT, two members of a British SAS team captured in
uniform in Italy in February 1945 were executed. See Farran, Operation Tombola at 7-8
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light of Hitler's Commando Order denying quarter to any partisans or Special
Operations Forces. 128
Fourth, perfidy requires mens rea, that is, the donning of civilian attire with
the clear intent to deceive. A group of alert, fit young men, heavily and openly
armed, surrounding an individual in military uniform, and themselves
surrounded by host nation military personnel in uniform, clearly are a personal
protection detail, and are not attempting to mask their status nor gain an
advantage over some unsuspecting enemy soldier.
The law of war regards a uniform as the principal way in which
conventional military forces distinguish themselves from the civilian population
in international armed conflict. State practice (including US practice), treaty
negotiation history, and the views of recognized law of war experts reveal (a)
that the law of war obligation is one of distinclion that otherwise has eluded
precise statement in all circumstances; (b) there is no agreed definition of uniform;
(c) the uniform "requirement" is less stringent with respect to Special Forces
working with indigenous forces or executing a mission of strategic importance;
and (d) a law of war violation occurs only where an act is perfidious, that is,
done with an intent to deceive, and the act is the proximate cause of the killing,
wounding, or capture of the enemy. My review of state practice found no
(cited in note 121); and Strawson, A Histoy of the S.A.S. Regiment at 275 (cited in note 5).
Similarly, German Security Forces ("SD") leader Josef Keiffer was tried and executed for
the murder of captured uniformed British Special Air Service troops. See Foot, SOE in
France at 305 (cited in note 34). See also Trial of Karl Buck and Ten Others, 5 Law Reports of
Trials of War Criminals 39 (HMSO 1948); Trial of Karl Adam Golkel and Thirteen Others, 5
Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals at 45 (murder of captured uniformed SAS pursuant
to Fiihrerbefeht; Trial of Generaloberst Nickolaus von Falkenhorst, 11 Law Reports of Trials of War
Criminals 18 (HMSO 1949); E.H. Stevens, ed, Trial of Nikolaus von Falkenhorst: Formery
Generaloberst in the German Army, in Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, ed, 6 War Crimes Trials
(William Hodge 1949) (murder of captured uniformed British commandoes pursuant to
Fiihrerbefehl; Trial of Werner Rohde and Eight Others, 5 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals at
54 (murder of captured female SOE).
The Japanese issued similar orders directing the execution of aviators and/or SOF.
In 1944 members of a combined British-Australian SOF team captured in uniform were
executed or died as a result of illegal medical experimentation, pursuant to such an order.
As a result of postwar proceedings, Japanese General Dihihara was hanged, while other
participants received lesser sentences. See Lynette Ramsay Silver, The Heroes of Rimau:
Unravelling the Mystg of One of World War II's Most Daring Raids 225 (Sally Milner 1990). See
also The Jaluit Atoll Case, 1 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 71 (HMSO 1947); Trial of
Lieutenant General Shiger Sawada and Three Others, 5 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 1
(HMSO 1948) (execution/murder of three captured US airmen); Trial of Lieutenant General
Harukei Isayama and Seven Others, 5 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 60 (HMSO 1948)
(murder of captured US aircrew).
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enforcement by a government against its own personnel.'29 Enemy combatants
captured in flagrante delicto were prosecuted as spies rather than for law of war
violations, with the exception of Ex parte Quirin and the unsuccessful post-
World War 1I US prosecution of SS-Obersturmbannfiihrer Otto Skorzeny.
In international armed conflict, the wearing of standard uniforms by
conventional military forces, including special operations forces, is the normal
and expected standard. Wearing civilian attire or a non-standard uniform is an
exception that should be exercised only in extreme cases determined by
competent authority.
In international armed conflict military necessity for wearing non-standard
uniforms or civilian clothing has been regarded by governments as extremely
restricted. It has been limited to intelligence collection or Special Forces
operations in denied areas. No valid military necessity exists for conventional
military forces, whether combat (combat arms, such as infantry, armor, or
artillery), combat support (such as Civil Affairs), or combat service support
personnel to wear non-standard uniforms or civilian attire in international armed
conflict.
The codified law of war for international armed conflict does not prohibit
the wearing of a non-standard uniform. It does not prohibit the wearing of
civilian clothing so long as military personnel distinguish themselves from the
civilian population, and provided there is legitimate military necessity for wearing
something other than standard uniform. The generally recognized manner of
distinction when wearing something other than standard uniform is through a
distinctive device, such as a hat, scarf, or armband, recognizable at a distance.
Violation of the law of war (peotidy) occurs when a soldier wears civilian
clothing-not a non-standard uniform-with intent to deceive, and the
deception is the proximate cause of the killing, wounding, or capture of the
enemy. Perfidy does not exist when a soldier in civilian attire or non-standard
uniform remains identifiable as a combatant, and there is no intent to deceive.
Discussion of the issue raises an appearance of a double standard in
considering Taliban militia/al Qaeda (in Afghanistan) or Saddam Fedayeen (in
Iraq) wear of civilian clothing while justifying SOF wear of Western civilian
attire or indigenous attire. A "double standard" exists within the law of war for
regular forces of a recognized government vis-a-vis unauthorized combatant acts
by private individuals or non-state actors. The issue was complicated by the
129 The inevitable reaction of some would be to suggest new legislation beyond the
prohibition of perfidy, or to make any act of perfidy a Grave Breach. History shows that
successful means and methods of warfare elude efforts at prohibiting them. See W. Hays
Parks, Making Lan, of War Treaties: Lessons from Submarine Warfare Regulation, .in Michael N.
Schmitt, ed, International Law across the Spectnm of Conflict: Essays in Honor of Professor L C
Green on the Occasion of his Eigbtietb Birthday, 75 International Law Studies 339 (US Naval
War College 2000).
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unique nature of operations in Afghanistan, that is, counter-terrorist operations
against non-state actors in a failed state, and the increased role of NGOs in a
non-linear combat environment.
The law of war principle of distinction cannot be taken lightly. The
standard military field uniform should be worn absent compelling military
necessity for wear of a non-standard uniform or civilian clothing. Military
convenience should not be mistaken for militagy necessity. That military personnel
may be at greater risk in wearing a uniform is not in and of itself sufficient basis
to justify wearing civilian clothing. "Force protection" is not a legitimate basis
for wearing a non-standard uniform or civilian attire. Risk is an inherent part of
military missions, and does not constitute military necessity for wear of civilian
attire. But the law of war requirement to wear a complete, "standard" uniform is
not as absolute as some recently suggested.
IN SUMMARY
The law of war requires military units and personnel to distinguish
themselves from the civilian population in international armed conflict. 3 ° Article
4(A)2 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
of August 12, 1949 sets forth standards all combatants are expected to satisfy.
However, military personnel may distinguish themselves from the civilian
population in other ways, such as physical separation.
Standard US military uniforms satisfy the requirements of Art 4A, GPW.
"Standard military uniform" refers to battle dress uniform ("BDU"), desert
camouflage uniform ("DCU"), official flight suit, or other obvious military
apparel.13 1 The presumption should be that all US armed forces operate in
standard uniforms during military operations in international armed conflict.
When authorized, the requirements of GPW Art 4(A)2 may be satisfied by
other than complete standard military uniform. For example, a visible part of the
standard military uniform, or a fixed, distinctive sign will satisfy the requirements
provided that the forces are recognizable as combatants with unenhanced vision
at a distance.
Neither the Global War on Terrorism nor the fact that one is a member of
Special Operations Forces offers carte blanche for military personnel to wear
something other than the full, standard uniform. The wearing of a partial
uniform or non-standard uniform with fixed, distinctive sign should be reserved
for exceptional circumstances when required by military necessity. Force
130 Stating the obvious, special operations missions outside international armed conflict, such
as counterterrorism, are not subject to these legal obligations.
131 For example, a heavily-armed Navy SEAL attired in a wet suit, fins, and face mask would
be distinctive from the civilian population except, perhaps, in the annual zany Bay-to-
Breakers foot race in San Francisco.
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protection does not constitute military necessity. Authority should be regarded
as extremely limited, mission- and unit-specific, and decided by a senior
commander or higher, such as (in the US military) the Combatant Commander
responsible for the mission.
While a hat, scarf, or armband would meet the fixed distinctive sign
requirement, a permanently affixed distinctive sign such as an American flag
sewn onto body armor or clothing is more prudent.
Forces operating in other than complete standard uniform should receive
training in the law of war to ensure that they understand the requirements of
distinction and are fully aware of the risks they may face if captured if they fail to
comply with the law of war.
Captured US military personnel (other than escaping prisoners of war)
wearing civilian apparel without a fixed distinctive sign and without visible
weapons may be considered spies by their captor. The captor may try them for
domestic law violations (for example, spying). Unless they otherwise commit an
independent law of war violation (for example, perfidy), history indicates that
the acts will not be regarded as violation of the law of war.
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APPENDIX
The list that follows is illustrative rather than exhaustive, and is offered for
historical purposes rather than necessarily with approval or condemnation of the
missions listed. With the exception of US action in Ex parte Quirin3 2 and the
unsuccessful prosecution of Otto Skorzeny,133 the list reveals that state practice
in international armed conflict has tended not to treat wear of civilian attire,
non-standard uniforms, and/or enemy uniforms by regular military forces as a
132 317 US 1 (1942) (discussed in note 31).
133 Trial of Otto SkorZeny and Others, 9 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 90 (HMSO 1949).
SS-Obersturmbannfiihrer (Lieutenant Colonel) Otto Skorzeny commanded a commando
mission during the last-ditch December 1944 German Ardennes Offensive to infiltrate
US lines wearing US Army uniforms. Eighteen members of his forty-four man team were
captured in US uniform; each was executed as a spy. Skorzeny was arrested in 1947. As
he was not captured in flagrante delicto, he could not be charged as a spy. See Hague
Convention IV, Annex art 31 (cited in note 29). Nor, however, was he charged with
violation of Hague Convention IV, Annex art 23(b), that is, "killing treacherously."
The court delivered its acquittal without explanation. Popular speculation has been
that the court accepted Skorzeny's claim that his men did not fight in US uniforms.
Skorzeny's defense was less that he and his men did not fight in US uniforms nor
necessarily tu quoque ("you also"), but rather based upon the international law principle of
rebus sic stanlibus ("substantial change of circumstances"). James J. Weingartmer, Otto
SkorZeny and the Laws of War, 55 J Milit Hist 207, 217-18 (1991). A major contribution to
Skorzeny's acquittal was the testimony of Royal Air Force Wing Commander Forest Yeo-
Thomas, a highly decorated veteran of British Special Operations Executive service, who
acknowledged that British Special Operations Executive engaged in similar conduct.
Other evidence was offered of similar US and British operations. Otto Skorzeny, My
Commando Operalions: The Memoirs of Hitler's Most Daring Commando 450-51 (Schiffer Milit
Hist 1995) (David Johnston, trans); and Weingartner, 55 J Milit Hist at 219 (cited above).
Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 153 (1965)
states that rebus sic stantibus means in part that:
An international agreement is subject to the implied condition that a
substantial change of a temporary or permanent nature, in a state of facts
existing at the time when the agreement became effective, suspends or
terminates, as the case may be, the obligations of the parties under the
agreement to the extent that the continuation of the state of facts was of such
importance to the achievement of the objectives of the agreement that the
parties would not have intended the obligations to be applicable under the
changed circumstances.
See also Wolfgang Friedman, Oliver J. Lissityn, and Richard C. Pugh, International Law,
Cases and Materials 417-21 (West 1969) (on file with author).
Based upon information known today, as exhibited in the state practice section of
this paper, a defense of rebus sic stantibus was plausible. It also is possible that the court
accepted the evidence more as the tu quoque defense, as was the case in the prosecution of
Admiral Karl D6nitz. Charged with conducting unrestricted submarine warfare, the court
declined to find Admiral D6nitz guilty of the charge when his defense presented a
statement by Admiral Chester Nimitz, USN, Commander in Chief, US Forces Pacific,
acknowledging that US submarines had conducted unrestricted submarine warfare
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war crime.'34 Personnel caught in flagrante delicto in civilian attire or enemy
uniforms have been treated as spies, sometimes (but not always) with severe
consequences.13' However, those who returned safely were decorated rather than
punished, manifesting an endorsement of their actions by their government.
The wearing of enemy uniforms is not directly within the scope of the
issue under consideration. However, State practice is germane regarding the
prohibition on "killing treacherously" contained in Article 23(b) of the Annex to
the 1907 Hague Convention IV. State practice shows that governments have
been willing to deploy Special Forces in civilian attire or enemy uniforms where
a major advantage is anticipated, and where the gain is greater than the risk to
the deployed personnel. Such actions have not been regarded as a war crime
either by the government ordering them or the government against which such
forces were employed.'36
134 As indicated in the preceding footnote, members of Skorzeny's commando team
captured wearing US Army uniforms were executed as spies. They were not charged with
violation of Article 23(b) of the Annex to the Hague Convention IV. Skorzeny could not
be charged as a spy, as he was arrested long after completion of his mission. His
prosecution as a spy was precluded by Article 31 of the Annex to the Hague Convention
IV, and no consideration was given to alleging a violation of Article 23(b). At the time of
the Skorzeny trial, law of war experts disagreed as to whether or not wearing an enemy
uniform in battle was illegal. Weingartner, 55 J Milit Hist at 213-14 (cited in note 133),
and Spaight, War Rights on Land at 105-06 (cited in note 38).
135 Michel, The Shadow War at 121 (cited in note 96), offers perspective on numbers:
Of 250 [SOE] agents who left London for Belgium ... 145 returned to Great
Britain but 105 were arrested; of the latter 25 were executed, 20 died from
maltreatment and 40 were deported, of whom only 20 survived. The casualty
rate therefore was a full 25 per cent.
136 Special forces' wear of enemy uniforms is more commonplace than generally known. For
example, summarizing the practice of the German special operations Brandenburg
Regiment, one study concluded, "Throughout the period 1941-1943, the usual
operational technique was the use of disguise in enemy uniforms." Edward N. Luttwak,
Steven L. Canby, and David L. Thomas, A Systematic Review of "Commando" (Spedal)
Operations, 1939-1980, 11-188 (C&L Associates unpublished report) (on file with author).
Efforts at summarizing pre-Protocol I law as to the wearing of enemy uniforms include
Valentine Jobst III, Is the Wearing of the Eney's Uniform a Violation of the Laws of War?, 35
Am J Intl L No 3 435 (uly 1941); and R.C. Hingorani, Prisoners of War 28-30 (N.M.
Tripathi 1963).
Article 39, 2 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I states:
It is prohibited to make use of the flags or military emblems, insignia or
uniforms of adverse Parties while engaging in attacks or in order to shield,
favour, protect or impede military operations.
16 ILM at 1409 (cited in note 32). This new law has not been tested. In addition to the
list in Section IV.B., there is considerable historical evidence to the contrary, including
since 1977. See Parks, 32 Air Force L Rev at 76 n259 (cited in note 52). The list that
follows shows that this provision is new law rather than a codification of customary
practice. Canada took a reservation to Article 39(2) on ratification. The Canadian
reservation, available online at <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/677558c021ecf2c14
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Table of Historical State Practice
Disposition
Who When Where (if any)
Japan 37  1904 (Russo- Manchuria Captured
Japanese officers in civilian Japanese
Chinese mission War)
Russia 38  1904 (Russo- Manchuria Japanese
Russian soldiers in Chinese Japanese diplomatic




Article 39-Emblems of nationality (Enemy uniforms). The Government of
Canada does not intend to be bound by the prohibitions contained in
paragraph 2 of Article 39 to make use of military emblems, insignia or
uniforms of adverse parties in order to shield, favor, protect or impede military
operations.
One may speculate on why the Diplomatic Conference supported this provision. Part of
the reason is that state practice was neither acknowledged nor well known. Aside from
personal accounts and the official works of M.R.D. Foot and Charles Cruickshank cited
herein, OSS records were not declassified until 1985, and the official SOE history, see
Mackenzie, The Secret History of SOE (cited in note 78), was not declassified until 1998.
Speaking from this author's experience, a "wall" between special operations forces and
the negotiating process existed that does not exist within the US government today.
While US negotiation guidance was coordinated within the Department of Defense, in all
likelihood it did not reach the closed-door, Cold War special operations environment that
prevailed at that time. Even if it had, it is entirely probable that the decision was taken
not to comment. The author's work with counterparts in other governments suggests
that this wall persists to this day within many governments.
137 See Spaight, War Rights on Land at 110 (cited at note 38).
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139 Lt. Col. W. F. Stirling, Safety Last 81, 94 (Hollis and Carter 1953); Wilson, Lawrence of
Arabia at 279-568 (cited at note 7). Lawrence served in the ranks of lieutenant to colonel.
Lawrence's awards included the French Legion d'Honneur, Companion of the Order of
the Bath (in lieu of a recommended Victoria Cross, denied on a technicality), and
Distinguished Service Order. Id at 251-52, 424-25, 492. He declined a recommendation
by King George V for a knighthood. Id at 577.
140 Lucas, Kommando at 29-39 (cited in note 79).
'4' Mackenzie, The Secret History of SOE at 334 (cited in note 78).
142 Where captured SOE personnel were executed without trial, those responsible were
prosecuted following World War II. See, for example, Trial of Wolfgang Zeuss (The
Natyeiler Trial), 5 War Crimes Trials (HMSO 1949).
143 Lucas, Kommando at 45 (cited in note 79).
144 Id at 49.
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145 Id at 71-73.
146 Shaw, Long Range Desert Group at 27 (cited in note 92); Gordon, The Other Desert War at 50
(cited in note 92); O'Carroll, Kiwi Scorpions at 75, 79 (cited in note 92).
147 Crichton-Stuart, G Patrol at 27, 38, 42 (cited in note 92).
148 Lucas, Kommando at 77 (cited in note 79).
149 ld at 84-85.
150 John Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad, 1 Stalin's War with Germany 240-48 (Harper & Row
1975); Erickson, The Road to Berlin at 114-15, 147 (cited in note 95); Ziemke and Bauer,
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315-16 (cited in note 95). These histories show that Soviet partisan units reached a peak
strength of 250,000 in 1943 and 1944, consisting of 40 percent civilians, 40 percent
Russian soldiers left behind German lines during Germany's invasion of Russia, and 20
percent Special Forces parachuted in to augment, organize, and direct partisan
operations.
151 Gordon Landsborough, Tobruk Commando 29-31, 35, 64-66 (Cassell 1956); Shaw, Long
Range Desert Group at 185-95 (cited in note 92); Owen, The Desert My Dwelling Place at 224-
27 (cited in note 92); Gordon, The Other Desert War at 119-26 (cited in note 92); Kelly, The
Lost Oasis at 233-34 (cited in note 111); Maj. Gen. I.S.O. Playfair and Brig. C.J.C.
Molony, The Mediterannean and Middle East: The Destruction of the Axis Forces in Africa, 4
History of the Second World War United Kingdom Military Series 20-23 (HMSO 1966). The
raiding party consisted of uniformed SAS posing as British prisoners of war guarded by
German-speaking Palestinian Jews, members of the British Special Identification Group
("SIG"), dressed in German uniforms. While Saul Kelly states that the German-
uniformed escort changed into British uniforms following infiltration and before fighting,
(see Kelly, The Lost Oasis at 233 (cited in note 111)), Lansborough indicates only the three
British officers who donned German uniforms at the last moment changed back into
British uniform, see id at 98. The raid proved a disaster, and captured SIG were executed.
Author's discussion with Saul Kelly, June 21, 2003. The raid was the basis for the movie
Tobruk (1967) starring Rock Hudson and George Peppard.
152 Callum MacDonald, The Killing of SS Obergruppenfihrer Reinhard Heydrich (Free Press 1989).
153 Yuriy Fedorovich Strekhnin, Commandos from the Sea: Soviet Naval SpetsnaZ in World War II
at 3, 58, 66, 71, 89-90 (Naval Institute, 1996) Games F. Gebhardt, trans).
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Disposition
Who When Where (if any)
Japan 54  1942 Malaya None
Used English-speaking
Germans (French Foreign
Legion) captured in Thailand
in Feb. 1941 dressed in
uniforms resembling British
khaki to penetrate British
fines
Germany 5 ' 1942 US Tried by
Eight German soldiers on military
sabotage mission captured in commission
civilian clothing for violation
of the laws of
war
United Kingdom/ 1943 Singapore Participants
Australia 56  commended
Operation JAYWICK,
combined SOF team
navigated to Singapore in
Japanese fishing boat Kofuku
Mara, flying Japanese flag and
dressed in native sarongs.
Attacked and sunk seven
ships (38,000 tons)
Poland 157  1943 Poland None
SOE-trained partisans, one
dressed in SS uniform, raided
Pinsk prison near Brest-
Litovsk, freed prisoners and
killed commandant
154 Peter Elphick, Singapore: The Pregnable Fortress 356-60 (Hodder and Stoughton 1995).
155 Ex parte Quiin, 317 US at 1. The eight German saboteurs were civilians. They wore
German naval uniforms when they boarded the submarine, and again at the time of their
landings in the United States. After landing, they changed into civilian clothing. The
uniforms were sent back to the U-boat. Fisher, Nai Saboteurs on Trial at 23, 26, 35 (cited
at note 31).
156 Brian Connel, Return of the Tiger 84, 122 (Doubleday 1961); Ronald McKie, The Heroes 58,
99, 146, 175 (Harcourt, Brace 1961); Lynette Ramsey Silver, Krait: The Fishing Boat that
Went to War (Sally Milner 1992). Illegal Japanese reprisals against Allied prisoners of war
and civilian internees held in Singapore was the basis for the postwar Trial of Sumida
Hauo and Twenoy Others (The 'Double Tenth" Trial), in Colin Sleeman and S.C. Silkin, eds, 8
War Crimes Trials (William Hodge 1951).
157 Foot, SOE:An Outline History at 193 (cited in note 78).
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Disposition
Who When Where (if any)




water plant at Vermok
Japan 59  1943 Burma Post-war trials
Formed Indian National of soldiers
Army from captured Indian captured
Army personnel, who fought under India
in Indian Army uniforms Army Act or
against British and Indian Penal
Commonwealth forces in Code rather
Burma than charges
of war crimes
United Kingdom 160  1944 Brac (Aegaen) Awarded
Lt. B.J. Barton, No. 2 Military Cross
Commando, penetrated
German defenses wearing
indigenous attire and killed
German commandant
158 Riste and N6kleby, Norway 1940-1945 at 59-60 (cited in note 83); Thomas Gallagher,
Assault in Norway: Sabotaging in the Nai Nuclear Bomb (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1975);
and Dan Kurzman, Blood and Water Sabotaging Hitler's Bomb 144-58 (Henry Holt 1997).
159 A detailed and fascinating account is contained in Leslie C. Green, Essays on the Modem
Law of War 41-434 (Transnational 2d ed 1999), based upon Professor Green's personal
participation in the post-war trials. The Indian National Army (Azad Hind Fauj) was
formed from Indian Army personnel captured during the 1942 Japanese conquest of
Hong Kong, Malaya, and Singapore. Subsequently the Japanese "recruited" its Indian
prisoners of war-through inducements as well as threats of violence and torture-to
enlist in the Indian National Army ("INA") to fight against British forces. Some, but not
all, did so. As Professor Green explains on page 411:
These "Volunteers" had indulged in infiltration and propaganda on behalf of
Free India among Indian Army personnel, often operating through Burma and
the Malayan advance behind British lines which, in view of their uniforms and
language, they were easily able to infiltrate, [sic] In addition, they were able to
indicate to the Japanese where British or Indian troops were hiding.
Professor Green notes that British military authorities began the prosecution of
personnel captured while fighting on behalf of the INA as early as the middle of 1943.
See id at 414-15. These prosecutions continued through the post-war period, gradually
becoming more selective with respect to those brought to trial. See id at 418. However,
accused were brought before courts martial for violations of the Indian Army Act or the
Indian Penal Code rather than being charged with a war crime for fighting in Indian
Army uniforms. See id at 431.
The role of the INA in Japanese operations against British forces in Burma is
described in Field Marshal, The Viscount Slim, Defeat into Victoy (David McKay 1961),
and Louis Allen, Burma: The Longest War, 1941-1945 (St. Martin's 1985).
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Disposition
Who When Where (if any)
United Kingdom1 61  1944 Crete None
British officers dressed as
German soldiers, with
partisan assistance, abducted
Major General Karl Kreipe,
Commander, 22nd Panzer
Division on Crete
United Kingdom 162  1944 Aegaen One Victoria
SAS wore mixed dress of Cross,
British, German, and Italian numerous
uniforms and civilian clothing other awards
United Kingdom 163  1944 Singapore Captured,
Operation RIMAU, died from
combined SF team in uniform illegal medical
attacked Japanese ships experiment-
ation or were
executed
United Kingdom 64  1944 Nisiros (Aegaen) None
Special Boat Squadron
("SBS") officer dressed as
priest led successful attack on
German units
160 Saunders, The Green Beret at 244-45 (cited in note 92); Messenger, The Commandos at 331-
32, 335 (cited in note 92); and William Seymour, Brilish Special Forces 49-50 (Sidgwick &
Jackson 1985).
161 W. Stanley Moss, Ill Met by Moonlight (MacMillan 1950). While SCE historian M.R.D.
Foot states that "SOE never attempted in France to do what the Lehr-Regiment Brandenburg
did on the other side in Russia: operate tactical or even strategic reconnaissance and
fighting patrols behind the lines in enemy uniform." Foot, SOE in France at 390 (cited in
note 34). While Stanley Moss never acknowledged his mission to have been SOE-
sponsored, the official SOE history acknowledges it as an SOE mission, Mackenzie, The
Secret History of SOE at 483 (cited in note 78). Moss's book is an early one, but the team's
priority of dispatch-a dozen parachute attempts before being delivered by ship-his
communications capabilities, his liaison with SOE operatives on Crete, and his less-than-
credible procurement of well-fitting German military police uniforms (the book contains
a photograph of Moss and his teammate in German uniforms) suggests that Foot's
statement denying any such activity "in France" was carefully crafted. A summary of
Moss's mission in Patrick Howarth, Undercover The Men and Women of the SOE 162-65(Phoenix 1980), adds to the official SOE acknowledgement. Lehr-Regiment Brandenburg
operations are the subject of Lucas, Kommando (cited in note 79).
162 Suzanne Lassen, Anders Lassen VC 121, 176 (Muller 1965) (Inge Hack, trans).
163 Silver, The Heroes of Rimau (cited in note 127) details the mission. In 1951, those
responsible for the illegal medical experimentation and execution of the captured Allied
personnel were convicted of war crimes by an Australian military court sitting on
Admiralty Island of Los Negros. Id at 228-29.
164 Ladd, SBS: The Invisible Raiders 64-66 (cited at note 92).
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Disposition
Who When Where (if any)
United Kingdom 165  1944 Norway None
SOE-trained/equipped
partisans sabotaged and sunk
ferry carrying German heavy
water
United States 166  1944 France, None
Office of Strategic Service Yugoslavia
("OSS") teams entered Nazi-
occupied Europe, conducted
operations in civilian clothing
and German uniform.
United States 167  1944 China None





United States 168  1944 Germany None
Army Rangers dressed as
German soldiers to penetrate
and fight in Aachen (OSS
operation)
United States/ 1944-45 France, Italy, None
United Kingdom1 69  Yugoslavia,
JEDBURGH teams operate Albania,
post-D-Day in support of Netherlands
partisans, not always in
uniform
165 Riste and N6dkleby, Norway 1940-1945 at 60-61 (cited in note 83); Kurzman, Blood and
Water Sabotaging Hitler's Bomb 224-38 (cited in note 158).
166 Joseph E. Persico, Piercing the Reich: The Penetration of Nazi Germany by American Secret Agents
during World War II at 12-115, 120-21, 126-27, 140-41 (Viking 1979); Paddock, U.S.
Army Special Warfare: Its Origins at 28 (cited in note 5).
167 Miles, A Different Kind of Warat 274, 371 (cited in note 106).
168 Charles Whiting, Bloody Aachen 143-46 (Stein and Day 1976). The US Army use of
German uniforms in the battle for Aachen was specifically mentioned in the defense of
SS-Obersturmbannfthrer Otto Skorzeny. See Weingartner, 55 J Milit Hist at 217-218 (cited
in note 133).
169 David Schoenbrun, Soldiers of the Night: The Stogy of the French Resistance 331 (Dutton 1980);
Hymoff, The OSS in World War II at 247-50 (cited in note 99); Casey, The Secret War
against Hitler at 74-75, 92, 94-95, 122-23, 146, 148, 154 (cited in note 99); Mackenzie, The
Secret Histogy of SOE at 603-04, 642 (cited in note 78). Jedburgh teams were planned for
Belgium, but were not deployed. Id at 604.
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Disposition
Who When Where (if any)
Germany70  1944 Belgium Members
German Kommando unit captured in
dressed in US uniforms and US uniforms
driving US vehicles executed;








Germany'71  1944-45 Germany None
Partisan operation by German
SF in civilian clothing
United Kingdom 172  1945 Italy None
Operation TOMBOLA, SAS
operation with Italian
partisans. Civilian attire with
mixed uniform
United States 173  1945 Germany Mission
OSS team in German aborted by
uniforms to conduct end of war
Operation IRON CROSS to
execute subversion missions
and capture or kill Nazi
officials
170 Trial of Otto Skor.eny and Others, 9 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals at 90-94 (cited in
note 133); Hugh M. Cole, The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge, Stetson Conn, ed, 8 United States
Army in World War II: European Theater of Operations 269-71 (Department of the Army
1965). See also discussion in note 133.
171 Lucas, Kommando at 205-06 (cited in note 79).
172 See Farran, Winged Dagger at 282-339 (cited at note 92); Farran, Operation Tombola at 13,
22, 25, 33, 59-60 (cited in note 121). The latter narrative suggests that some partisans
wore distinctive emblems relating to their communist or non-communist affiliation, or
allegiance to the group with whom they were associated (somewhat akin to modern day
gang "colors") rather than as distinctive devices in the traditional law of war sense.
173 Persico, Pierdng the Reich at 253 (cited in note 166); Bank, From OSS to Green Berets at 73-
99 (cited in note 5). A photograph of the London OSS fitting room, showing an OSS
agent being outfitted in German Wermacht uniform, is in Francis Russell, The Secret War
106 (Time-Life 1981).
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Disposition
Who When Where (if any)
United States 74  1945 China None
OSS Operations Groups
operated in US uniforms,
indigenous attire, and Chinese
Puppet Army uniforms
Indonesia (1)175 1965 Singapore Captured and
Soldiers dressed in civilian tried under
attire while attacking civilian domestic law
objects
Indonesia (11)176 1965 Singapore Captured and
Soldiers in civilian attire tried under
captured while on mission to domestic law
attack civilian objects





while operating in denied
areas
United States 78  1968 Vietnam Awarded
SF soldier fought in civilian Medal of
clothing in response to Tet Honor
Offensive enemy attacks
174 Mills, Mills, and Brunner, OSS Special Operations in China (cited in note 7).
175 Krofan, 1 Malayan LJ at 133 (cited in note 31).
176 Osman bin Haji Mohamed Ali v Public Prosecutor, 1 AC 430 (Privy Council 1969) (appeal
taken from Malaysia) (UK).
177 John Plaster, SOG: The Secret Wars of America's Commands in Vietnam 143 (Simon and
Schuster 1997). Some, including US Road Runner teams operating in North Vietnam,
wore sterile field uniforms or indigenous straw conical hats to delay positive enemy
identification at a distance. Interview with Lt. Col. L.H. Burruss, SF, USA Qune 12,
2002).
178 The Medal of Honor citation of Sgt. Drew D. Dix, USA, reads as follows:
Learning that a nurse was trapped in a house near the center of the city, S/Sgt.
Dix organized a relief force, successfully rescued the nurse, and returned her
to the safety of the Tactical Operations Center. Being informed of other
trapped civilians within the city, S/Sgt. Dix voluntarily led another force to
rescue 8 civilian employees located in a building which was under heavy
mortar and small-arms fire. S/Sgt. Dix then returned to the center of the city.
Upon approaching a building, he was subjected to intense automatic rifle and
machine gun fire from an unknown number of Viet Cong. He personally
assaulted the building, killing six Viet Cong, and rescuing two Filipinos. The
following day S/Sgt. Dix, still on his own volition, assembled a 20-man force
and though under intense enemy fire cleared the Viet Cong out of the hotel,
theater, and other adjacent buildings within the city. During this portion of the
attack, Army Republic of Vietnam soldiers inspired by the heroism and
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Disposition
Who When Where (if any)
Soviet Union179  1968 Czechoslovakia None
Spetsnaz dressed as tourists
disabled the Prague airport
before disembarkation of
planes carrying Soviet troops.
United States'8 0  1972 South Vietnam Awarded
Navy SEAL officer switched Medal of
from uniform to indigenous Honor
attire to fight way in and out
of encircled aircrew to rescue
him
success of S/Sgt. Dix, rallied and commenced firing upon the Viet Cong.
S/Sgt. Dix captured 20 prisoners, including a high ranking Viet Cong official.
He then attacked enemy troops who had entered the residence of the Deputy
Province Chief and was successful in rescuing the official's wife and children.
S/Sgt. Dix's personal heroic actions resulted in 14 Viet Cong killed in action
and possibly 25 more, the capture of 20 prisoners, 15 weapons, and the rescue
of 14 United States and free world civilians. The heroism of S/Sgt. Dix was in
the highest tradition and reflects great credit upon the US Army.
Available online at <http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/mohviet.htmn> under "Dix, Drew
Dennis" (visited Oct 11, 2003).
179 Viktor Suvorov, Spetsna." The Inside Stogy of the Soviet Special Forces 131, 161 (Norton 1987).
180 This was the famous rescue by Lieutenant Thomas R. Norris, USN, of Lieutenant
Colonel Iceal E. Hambleton, USAF, commonly referred to as Bat 21, the designation of
the B66 in which Lieutenant Colonel Hambleton served as navigator. (Lieutenant Colonel
Hambleton actually was Bat 21B.) See Darrel D. Whitcomb, The Rescue of Bat 21 (Naval
Institute 1998). The Vietnamese mentioned in Norris' citation was Nguyen Van Kiet, a
South Vietnamese frogman. For his actions, he became the only Vietnamese in the war to
be awarded the US Navy Cross. See Bosiljevac, SEALs: UDT/SEAL Operation in Vietnam
at 211-213 (cited in note 5). The 1988 movie Bat-21, starring Danny Glover and Gene
Hackman, errs in depicting this as solely an Air Force rescue. Lieutenant Norris' Medal of
Honor citation clearly acknowledges his fighting in civilian clothing, and the US
Government's approval of his actions:
Lt. Norris completed an unprecedented ground rescue of 2 downed pilots
deep within heavily controlled enemy territory in Quang Tri Province. Lt.
Norris, on the night of 10 April, led a 5-man patrol through 2,000 meters of
heavily controlled enemy territory, located 1 of the downed pilots at daybreak,
and returned to the Forward Operating Base (FOB). On 11 April, after a
devastating mortar and rocket attack on the small FOB, Lt. Norris led a 3-man
team on 2 unsuccessful rescue attempts for the second pilot. On the afternoon
of the 12th, a forward air controller located the pilot and notified Lt. Norris.
Dressed in fishermen disguises and using a sampan, Lt. Norris and 1 Vietnamese
traveled throughout that night and found the injured pilot at dawn. Covering
the pilot with bamboo and vegetation, they began the return journey,
successfully evading a North Vietnamese patrol. Approaching the FOB, they
came under heavy machinegun fire. Lt. Norris called in an air strike which
provided suppression fire and a smoke screen, allowing the rescue party to
reach the FOB. By his outstanding display of decisive leadership, undaunted
courage, and selfless dedication in the face of extreme danger, Lt. Norris
enhanced the finest traditions of the U.S. Naval Service.
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Disposition
Who When Where (if any)
Israel 18  1973 Lebanon Team
Operation Aviv Neurim, commander
Israeli Defense Force ("IDF") Ehud Barak
SF team dressed in civilian eventually
clothing raided PLO Beirut became IDF
targets Chief of Staff,
Israeli Prime
Minister
Israel i82  1976 Uganda Mission
Entebbe rescue force successful in
included commandos dressed rescuing




Available online at <http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/mohviet2.htm> (under "Norris,
Thomas R.") (visited Oct 11, 2003) (emphasis added).
181 Yeshayahu Ben-Porat, Eiten Haber, and Zeev Schiff, Entebbe Rescue 210 (Delacorte 1976)
(Louis Williams, trans); Neil C. Livingstone and David Halevy, Inside the PLO: Covert Units,
Secret Funds, and the Wlar against Israel in the United States 36-37 (Morrow 1990); Israeli
Defence Forces Weekly Ba'Macbaneb (1998) (on file with author); e-mail message to
author from David H. Halevy, Global Options, Inc (July 8, 2003) (on file with author).
The operation took place during the night of April 9-10, 1973. Barak was dressed as a
woman, with a long, dark wig, false breasts, and women's clothing. An interview with
retired Brigadier General Emanuel Shaked, commander of the actual operation, tells the
story:
The task of killing the three senior members of the PLO was entrusted to the
Sayeret Matkal people. They walked singly and in pairs at a distance of ten
meters one from the other as if there was no relationship between them, wrote
Moshe Zondar in his book "Sayeret Matkal". Four of the warriors were
disguised as women. Ehud Barak's wig was black. Amiram Levine (destined to
become Commanding General of the Northern Command and Deputy Head
of the Mossad) boasted a red hairpiece. Loni Rafaeli and Danny Bar looked
like blond women. In accordance with the dictates of fashion, Barak wore
widening pants and within his large breasts, artificial of course, he hid
explosive blocks.
Barak walked in front with "her" partner, Mukl Betzer, who wore a
civilian suit. To the Lebanese passerby the two looked like a man and a
woman, normal citizens. In fact, a pair of Lebanese Gendarmieres, who strode
towards them on the sidewalk, gave them a close look, and Betzer, who
strengthened his lovers hug, dared even to rub shoulders with the Lebanese
uniform bearer, who was forced to give in and to step down to the road with
his partner. The Lebanese did not know that in front of them was a deadly
couple, leading the force forward.
The attack on three separate Palestine Liberation Organization targets was successful. E-
mail message to author from Col. Daniel Reisner, Israeli Defence Force, (Aug 6, 2003)
(on file with author).
182 William Stevenson, 90 Minutes at Entebbe 109, 112 (Bantam 1976).
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Disposition
Who When - Where (if any)
Soviet Union 183  1979 Afghanistan None
SpetsnaZ dressed in civilian
clothing neutralized senior
Afghan officers, then secured
Kabul Airport wearing
Afghan Army uniforms
United States'14  1980 Iran Mission
Team for rescue of US aborted due
hostages in American to helicopter
Embasssy in Tehran wore failures
non-standard uniforms
approved by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and President
Soviet Union,18 5 East Cold War NATO nations Never
Germany executed
SpetsnaZ dressed in civilian
clothing or NATO uniforms
trained/planned to
penetrate/operate in NATO
rear, attack high-value targets
North Korea 186  1950-88 South Korea Treated as
SF infiltrated South Korea spies when
wearing civilian clothing or caught
South Korean uniforms
183 Michael G. Welham and Bruce Quarrie, Operation Spetsnaz: The Aims, Tactics and Techniques
of Soviet Special Forces 40 (Patrick Stephens 1989); Department of Defense, Soviet Military
Power 72 (1985).
184 Personal knowledge of the author. Each aircraft carried Iranian markings to be stuck on
the fuselage in the event an aircraft had to be abandoned. For the history of the mission,
see Paul B. Ryan, The Iranian Rescue Mission: Why It Failed (Naval Institute 1985), and Col.
James H. Kyle, The Guts to Ty (Orion 1990).
185 Welham and Quarrie, Operation SpetsnaZ at 31-32 (cited in note 183); Ross S. Kelly,
SpetsnaZ: Special Operations Forces of the USSR, 12 Def & Foreign Aff 28-29 (Dec 1984) (on
file with author); Dale Van Atta, SpetsnaZ: The Soviets' Sinister Strike Force, 65 Reader's
Digest 72 (Apr 1986).
186 Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., North Korea Special Forces 21, 33, 53, 54, 70 (Jane's 1988). North
Korean Special Forces' disguises included dressing as civilian males and females; see id at
37, 70. North Korean use of South Korean uniforms or civilian clothing cannot be
documented to present, but is likely.
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187 See Livingstone and Halevy, Inside the PLO at 31-58 (cited in note 181). Team members
wore unmarked black fireproof coveralls. Id at 50.
188 E-mail message to author from Lt. Col. Kevin H. Govern, JA, USA (June 18, 2003) (on
file with author).
189 Personal knowledge of the author, photograph in author's files.
190 See Ratcliffe, Botham, and Hitchen, Eye of the Stor at 214, 305 (cited in note 20).




Sarqyet Makta/ wearing non-
standard uniforms carried out
successful direct action
mission to kill Abu Jihad,
PLO military commander, in
Tunis
Panama 8
7th Infantry Company (Macho
de Monte), Panamanian
Defense Forces, fought in
civilian attire of shorts, t-
shirts, and straw hats
United States189
Commander-in-Chief's SF




SF wore kaffiyeh/agal and
indigenous coats over
uniforms during operations in
Iraq
When
1988
1989
1990-91
1991
Where
Sidi-bou-Said,
Tunisia
Panama
(Operation
JUST CAUSE)
Saudi Arabia
Iraq
Disposition
(if any)
None
Captured
members
treated as
prisoners of
war by US
None
None
